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"A person who has some retirement income can also draw 
unemployment compensation under present circumstances. 
Corrective legislation should be enacted, because I believe it is the 
intent to take care of those unemployed who are in real need, but 
not to give windfalls to people who are not actually, or morally, at 
least, if they are legally, entitled to it under present laws."
Cong. Clarence Brown,
Cong. Record, 87:1, 2940, March 1, 1961
"Millions of people in the country today draw pensions, most of 
which are inadequate. If such persons were caught up in the 
present unemployment situation, some of them would have that 
unemployment compensation reduced by the amount of their 
pension payments. If anyone can show me 100 cases in which the 
persons involved are getting rich out of the unemployment 
compensation, I will apologize publicly to the Senate."
Sen. Hubert Humphrey,
Cong. Record, 87:1, 4197, March 16, 1961
"Gold had chipped in for the good used car in which Gussie drove 
them about in Florida. To Sid, Julius gave all the credit. 'Sid fixed 
it so I would first get my unemployment insurance, then my Social 
Security.' "
Joseph Heller, Good as Gold, 1979
A number of individuals have helped in the completion of this 
project. Robert Nevius did the programming that made the 
Retirement History Survey tapes usable and Eleanor Boyles of the 
Michigan State University Library provided service far beyond the 
call of duty in obtaining various documents needed for the 
preparation of the monograph. Careful typing was provided by 
Judy Smalley and Terie Snyder. Comments on various parts of the 
manuscript were received from Paul Burgess, Philip Booth, 
Robert Hutchens, Jerry Kingston, and, most especially, from Saul 
Blaustein. Nguyen Quan should be viewed as a coauthor of 
chapter 2, though in no way is he responsible for any conclusions 
later in the monograph that may be linked to that chapter. Harold 
Hamermesh provided the initial inspiration for undertaking this 
study. Finally, I am indebted to the W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research for providing the funding that made the 
study possible. Neither they nor the individuals I have thanked are 
in any way responsible for any errors remaining in the work, nor 
for any opinions expressed.
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Foreword
In April 1980, federal legislation took effect requiring a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction in payment of unemployment insur 
ance benefits to recipients of pension and Social Security benefits. 
This study is an especially timely inquiry into the likely 
distributional effects of the change and its potential effects on 
labor market and consumption behavior of older people.
The aging of the U.S. population will have an increasingly 
important effect on federal transfer programs such as unemploy 
ment insurance. Dr. Hamermesh analyzes a number of policy 
issues within an economic framework and addresses his findings to 
current discussion of income maintenance policy for the elderly.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are the sole 
responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily 
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The debate typified by the epigraph to this volume was over 
provisions proposed as part of the temporary extension of the 
potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits 
during the 1961 recession. While pensioners were not denied 
regular UI benefits, the compromise legislation did provide that 
extended UI payments should be reduced by the amount of 
pension benefits (but not Social Security old age benefits) 
received. This debate spurred a rash of studies by state UI research 
groups on the extent to which pensioners receive UI benefits, and a 
summary of these studies with a consideration of the policy issues 
was produced by Merrill Murray (1967).
The issue appeared dead between 1967 and 1975: no state 
studies were done on the subject, and, while bills were occasionally 
introduced on it in Congress, none even led to hearings, much less 
to floor debate. In 1976, though, after substantial hearings and 
debate, and as part of a complex series of changes included in the 
UI Amendments of 1976, a federal standard of a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction of UI payments against all retirement income was 
enacted.' The debate over this restriction paralleled that in the
1. P.L. 94-566. The provision was not included in the House bill, but was added by the 
Senate Finance Committee, approved by the Senate and by the House-Senate Conference 
Committee. It states, "the amount of compensation payable to an individual for any week 
which begins after September 30, 1979 [later amended to March 31, 1980], and which 
begins in a period with respect to which such individual is receiving a governmental or other 
pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is 
based on the previous work of such individual shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an 
amount equal to the amount of such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity or other 
payment, which is reasonably attributable to such week."
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1961 debate, though in 1976 there appeared to be a greater 
awareness, even on the part of liberal legislators, that abuses 
occurred. For example, one stated:
[It] should be clear that it is unconscionable and an 
aberration of our unemployment compensation laws that 
some retirees with large annuities or pensions also are 
permitted to receive unemployment compensation benefits. 
The public perceives this as a rip-off of Government funds, 
and justifiably so. ... [However], it does not make good 
sense or good public policy to completely cut off from the 
unemployment compensation system a retiree who receives $5 
a month from a pension or annuity. 2
The 1976 legislation was initially intended to become effective in 
1979, "permitting the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation [created in the 1976 Amendments] opportunity for 
a thorough study of this issue and the Congress to act in light of its 
findings and recommendation." 3 (Because of delays in organizing 
the Commission, the effective date of the restriction was later 
delayed until 1980. Efforts were also made to prevent the 
restriction from ever taking effect or to weaken its impact, but it 
became effective in April 1980.)4 It is this restriction on the 
simultaneous receipt of retirement benefits and UI and the stated 
need "for a thorough study" that provide part of the motivation 
for this volume.
The need for a study is underscored by the lack of available 
information on the distribution of UI payments among the 
elderly, among pensioners in particular, and on how UI affects 
their behavior. Discussions of the merits of restricting UI 
payments to pensioners have often ignored what would seem to be 
basic issues. The effect of such a restriction on the distribution of 
income within the entire population and among older workers
2. Senator Gaylord Nelson, Congressional Record, 94:2, 17016, September 29, 1976.
3. House Conference Report No. 94-1745, page 16.
4. In June 1979, Congressman Corman of California introduced H.R. 4464 to repeal the 
federal restriction on the receipt of UI by pensioners. His bill received substantial support 
from groups of retired persons, from the AFL-CIO, and from representatives of the 
Department of Labor in hearings held in September 1979.
UI and Pensioners 3
alone has not been considered. Potential effects on the ability of 
older workers to maintain living standards at or above some 
minimum level have also received no attention. Nor has the effect 
of such a restriction on the operation of the labor market, 
particularly on the retirement decision of older workers, been 
considered in discussions of this policy. Instead, the recommenda 
tions have been based either on arguments regarding the proper 
role of federal legislation in setting standards for state UI laws, or 
on arguments that the restriction would introduce needs 
considerations into a program that has been a social insurance 
rather than a welfare program. 5
It is hoped that this volume will fill part of the void. It should 
also shed some additional light on the more general, and 
increasingly important, issue of retirement behavior. With the age 
structure of the population of the United States tilting toward 
people 55 and over, the neglected area of the economics of the 
elderly needs to be considered in much greater depth. As a 
byproduct of the general discussion of UI and the elderly, and of 
examination of the economic merits of restricting UI payments to 
pensioners, the findings of this study should also enhance the 
existing knowledge of the economic situation of the older 
population. Before delving into the particular studies that 
comprise the bulk of this volume, though, the way in which state 
UI laws treat the issue and the general outcomes of those laws 
among the older population need to be considered.
Facts About UI and Older People 
in the U.S. and Elsewhere
As table 1.1 shows, persons 55 years and older comprised nearly 
one-sixth of all UI recipients in a recent year. This was nearly 
double their representation among the unemployed counted in the
5. For example, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) 
disposed of its obligation to consider the issue by arguing that the federal restriction should 
not be allowed to become effective: (1) Because no other benefit standards at the federal 
level have been adopted; and (2) Because it implies viewing UI as a needs-based program 
(NCUC, Interim Report, November 1978, pp. 95-100). The Commission does not appear to 
have engaged in any formal study of this issue.
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monthly Current Population (household) Survey (CPS) used to 
compute the national unemployment rate. The figures are not 
quite comparable; older workers do account for a greater fraction 
of CPS unemployment among experienced workers than is implied 
by column (2) in the table. However, after appropriate 
adjustments are made, it may be inferred that workers 55 and over 
represented about 10 percent of unemployed job losers, job 
leavers, and labor force reentrants. 6 Comparing this to their share 
of insured unemployed, it may be inferred, though by no means 
has it been proven, that the UI system is paying benefits to a 
disproportionate number of elderly individuals who do not 
consider themselves to be unemployed by the commonly accepted 
criteria contained in the household survey. This finding 
underscores the importance of the problem of payment of UI 
benefits to the older population, and points out the necessity of 
more detailed analysis of the issue such as is contained in chapters 
2 - 4 of this volume.
There are no data on the amount of UI benefits received by 
individuals 55 and over. It is likely, though, that around $1.5 
billion of the benefits paid in 1978 accrued to older workers, as 
this figure amounts to one-sixth of the $9 billion in UI payments 
for that year. Since base-period earnings, and thus weekly 
benefits, are likely to be at least as high among older recipients as 
for the average UI beneficiary, and since duration is longer for 
older workers, the $1.5 billion may even be a low estimate. 
Further, studies by the U.S. Bureau of Employment Security of 
claimants of regular state UI benefits (done in conjunction with 
the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1961) show that 7 percent of all claimants also received Old Age
6. In 1977, new entrants to the labor force accounted for 14 percent of the unemployed in 
the CPS data. Assuming none of these is age 55 or over, and removing them from the totals 
in order to get a count of the experienced unemployed, results in an estimated 9.7 percent 
(8.5 x 1.14) of the experienced unemployed age 55 +. This is a far smaller percentage than 
their representation among the insured unemployed. It may appear unusual to include 
unemployed reentrants and job leavers in the unemployed for purposes of this comparison, 
as few people in either category are likely to be among the insured unemployed. However, 
unlike new entrants, there is no reason to assume that older workers are less than 
proportionately represented among the CPS unemployed classified as job leavers or 
reentrants. Thus their retention in the calculation will not bias the comparison.
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and Survivors' Insurance (OASI) retirement benefits, 3 percent 
received other retirement benefits, and 8 percent of all claimants 
received some form of retirement benefit. Since only 21 percent of 
UI claimants in 1961 were 55 or over, it may be concluded that a 
substantial fraction of older claimants in 1961 received some 
pension income. 7 This conclusion is likely to be even more valid in 
1979. (Chapter 2 provides some more detailed evidence on this.) 
As shown below, there has been only a slight expansion since the 
early 1960s in the extent to which states impose restrictions on 
receipt of retirement income and UI benefits. At the same time, 
the coverage and level of private pension benefits (including those 
paid to government employees) and of OASI have been increasing. 
(Partly as a result, people are retiring earlier in life.)
That the coverage of private pension programs has increased is 
unquestionable. In 1965, pension recipients accounted for only 7.8 
percent of individuals 55 and over; by 1974, this figure had risen to 
15.5 percent. 8 (Note that this is based on individuals; clearly, 
substantially higher percentages of people 55 and over are in 
families containing persons who received part of their income in 
the form of pension benefits.) Beneficiaries of OASI retirement 
programs also increased in the same period, from 39.6 percent of 
people 55 and over in 1965 to 47 percent in 1974. Moreover, OASI 
retirement benefit amounts became much more liberal after 1970. 
Until that year, the average primary insurance amount never
7. Calculated from Haber and Murray (1966, p. 474) and from Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Employment Security, TEUC Report, No. U-225-5. The 21.5 percent figure is, 
as can be seen from a comparison with table 1.1, substantially above today's percentage. 
The difference is even greater than it appears; 1961 was a year of deep recession, whereas 
1977 represented a recovery year, and the fraction of older workers among the insured 
unemployed is lower in a recession (see Hamermesh 1977, p. 22). The apparent long term 
decline in the representation of older workers among the insured unemployed likely has 
three causes: (1) The drop in labor force participation among persons 55 + in the past 
twenty years has meant that fewer older persons are eligible for UI if they are not at work; 
(2) Expansions of coverage have been to industries and firms that employ proportionately 
fewer older workers than industries that were already covered by 1961; and (3) A sharp rise 
in the fraction of youth in the population and the labor force has occurred. 
8. The numerators for these calculations are from Munnell (1977, p. 6), and the 
denominators are from Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-25, Nos. 321 
and 643.
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exceeded 32 percent of the average wage in manufacturing. (It was 
29 percent in 1965.) By 1974 it had climbed to 37 percent, and in 
1976 it was 40 percent of the manufacturing wage. 9 The 1977 
Social Security Amendments, which legislated long-run stability in 
replacement rates, ensure that, while this rise will not continue, 
replacement rates will stay at the higher levels of the early 1970s 
rather than revert to the lower levels of the 1960s. We may 
conclude that both the coverage and levels of retirement schemes, 
both employer-based pensions and Social Security retirement 
benefits, have increased substantially since the middle 1960s.
Table 1.1
Percentage of Older Workers Among the Insured Unemployed, All 
Unemployed, and the Labor Force, by Selected Sex-Age Categories, 
1977 a_____________________________________ 
___ Percent older workers among;______ 
Sex-age Insured All Civilian 
category unemployed b unemployed___labor force 
Men 
55-59 3.9 ) 4.4
3.6
60-64 3.3 ) 2.8 
65-1- 2.8 1.4 1.9
Women
55-59 2.7 ) 2.8
\ 2.8
60-64 2.1 j 1.6 
65+ 1.6 .7 1.1
Total 55 +________16.4________8.5________14.6
SOURCE: Unemployment Insurance Statistics, October-December 1977 and 1978; 
Employment and Training Report of the President, 1978. 
a. As a percent of the entire population in the category, 
b. Fiscal year 1977.
9. Munnell (1977, p. 64).
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The effect of these rather sudden changes is shown by the data 
in table 1.2. While there was little change in the relative economic 
position of households headed by older persons in the 1960s, there 
has been a steady and sharp improvement since that time in their 
relative incomes. This is especially true for households headed by 
persons 65 and over, and it has occurred despite the continued 
trend of a decreasing fraction of persons 65 and over remaining in 
the labor force. Improvements in private and public retirement 
income programs have clearly been the dominant factor in these 
changes in the economic position of older Americans.
Table 1.2
Median Income of Families Headed by Older Persons, Relative to 
Median Income of All Families, by Age of Household Head, 1964,1969, 
1973, 1977__________________________________ 





















SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-60, Nos. 47, 75, 97, 118.
At the beginning of the UI program, most states denied benefits 
to recipients of OASI retirement benefits (see Haber and Murray 
1966). Over the years these restrictions were eased, so that by 
1964, as table 1.3 shows, only 18 states, containing 26 percent of 
the covered work force, imposed any restrictions on the 
simultaneous receipt of OASI retirement benefits and UI 
payments. This changed little between 1964 and 1979: in 1971, 
only 14 states, containing 27 percent of the covered work force, 
imposed such a restriction; the figures for January 1979 were 17 
states and 23 percent. Further, in January 1979 only two states, 
Arizona and Oregon, completely disqualified a recipient of such 
benefits (though Wisconsin did so, too, in certain cases); in most 
of the other 15 states there are provisions for prorated reductions 
in UI benefit payments related to the amount of OASI payments 
received.
8 UI and Pensioners
Table 1.3
Summary of State UI Statutory Provisions on Pension Restrictions,






Provision 1964 1971 1979 1964 1971 1978
No restriction 20
Restrict old age 
insurance only 1
Restrict pension from 
base-period 
employer only 12
Restrict pension from 
any employer 2
Restrict old age 
insurance and base- 
period employer 5




19 15 32.6 29.2 22.5
1 1 4.5 5.0 6.1
16 18 35.0 33.5 41.4
3 3 6.7 9.8 12.9
8 3.2 2.6 7.3
10 8 18.0 19.9 9.8
52 53 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Comparison of State UI Laws, January 1964; August 1971; January 1979; 
Unemployment Insurance Statistics, November 1964; July-September 1971; October- 
December 1978.
a. Based on UI provisions as of January in 1964 and 1979 and as of August in 1971.
The number of states that restrict the simultaneous receipt of 
private pensions and UI benefits has grown over the years. There 
was little legislation on this in the early days of the federal-state UI 
program, but by 1964, 31 states, having 63 percent of the covered 
work force, imposed some form of restriction. This changed little 
in the 1960s, but by January 1979, 37 states, containing 71 percent 
of covered employment, imposed restrictions of this sort. While 
restriction is thus fairly widespread, its effects may not be as 
important as they appear, as only two states, Arizona and 
Wisconsin, deny benefits to pension recipients. Further, in most 
other states the prorated reduction in benefits is made only for
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those pension receipts towards which a large fraction of the 
contributions has been made by the employer; even then, in most 
cases, only pensions from the base-period employer are restricted.
The trend of legislation in this area leads to several conclusions 
about public thinking on the issue. Although OASI retirement 
benefits have become much more liberal over the years, states 
appear to be continuing the "federal policy that unemployment 
compensation should not be denied to persons drawing federal 
old-age insurance benefits." 10 However, the increasingly wide 
spread applicability of private pension plans, often noncontribu- 
tory or only partly employee-financed, appears to have spurred 
more states to impose more restrictions on the receipt of UI 
benefits along with private pension payments.
The United States is among the more generous Western nations 
in allowing the simultaneous receipt of UI benefits and public or 
private retirement benefits. Two types of restriction are common 
in other Western countries, and in most they involve complete 
denial rather than just pro rata reductions in UI benefits. In some 
countries, benefits are denied to workers who have reached a 
certain age regardless of their current or prior labor force status. 
(Often the age limit is higher for men than for women.) These 
include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (in some cantons), 
and the United Kingdom. In other countries the restriction is 
based on the receipt of a pension, or upon receiving a pension and 
attaining a certain age. These nations include Canada, Italy, and 
Norway. 11 As the U.S. is generally considered to have one of the 
less liberal panoplies of income maintenance systems, it is not 
clear why on this particular issue our policy is unusually liberal. It 
may be, though, that the politics of running 53 separate state UI 
programs (including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands) along with a single federal old age benefit 
program has prevented the integration that exists in other 
countries where policy for both programs is set by the national
10. Haber and Murray (1966, p. 472).
11. This information is taken from Blaustein and Craig (1977, Table 4).
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government. Similarly, there may have been less concern here, 
until recently, about providing incentives to older workers to stay 
in the labor force.
What This Monograph Does
The central portion of this monograph consists of three essays 
on the economic impact of UI on the older worker. Chapter 2 
examines one of the equity aspects of the program, namely, the 
effects of UI on the distribution of income among older people 
and the potential impact of the pension restriction embodied in the 
1976 UI Amendments. Unless we know which older people will be 
hurt more by the restriction, all the arguments about the need to 
maintain the program's integrity as social insurance or to maintain 
a proper federal-state structure will have little impact. So too will 
the usual economists' arguments about the potential disincentive 
effects the program may currently contain.
Chapter 3 examines a different aspect of the equity impact of UI 
on the older population. Rather than considering how it affects 
the relative economic standing of members of the population, it 
examines instead how much UI really serves to prevent severe 
hardship among older recipients. In this context, the analysis 
focuses on whether and to what extent the program prevents the 
individual older worker from being forced to curtail his purchases 
sharply when he experiences a spell of unemployment. This 
analysis can inform us whether UI is needed by the older 
population, or whether it merely enables most older recipients to 
add a few extra consumption items not part of the basic 
commodities required for a minimally acceptable standard of 
living.
Chapter 4 considers the relationship between receipt of UI 
benefits and subsequent retirement and labor force status. While 
Murray (1967) did summarize the state studies of this relationship, 
none of those studies held constant for other factors that affect 
people's decisions to retire. Moreover, none contained a 
nationally representative sample of older workers, making the 
results obtained in those studies somewhat difficult to generalize.
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In this examination of the issue, other factors that have been 
shown to affect retirement decisions are accounted for, and the 
analysis is based on a national sample of UI recipients and other 
older people.
Each of the three chapters uses as the basis for the empirical 
work the data from the Retirement History Survey. This survey, 
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Social Security 
Administration, was based on persons age 58-63 in 1969. The 
sample was representative of the older population in the groups of 
married men, unmarried men, and single women, as it included all 
such persons in the most recent discontinued Current Population 
Survey (CPS) rotation groups. Nineteen such groups were used in 
order to produce a sufficiently large sample; since the CPS is 
representative of the population, the Retirement History Survey is 
representative of older men and unmarried older women.
The initial wave of successful interviews included 11,153 
persons, of whom 60.7 percent were married males, 10.7 percent 
unmarried males, and 28.6 percent single females. Exactly 90 
percent of the respondents in 1969 were white; 21.4 percent had a 
high school diploma only, and 16.5 percent had completed at least 
one year of college. Each surviving respondent was to be 
reinterviewed biennially through 1979. When the work embodied 
in chapters 2-4 was done, data were available for 1969, 1971, and 
1973. For each wave, interviewing was done between April and 
June of the survey year. Because of death and other causes of 
sample attrition, only 9,924 people remained in the sample in 1971 
and only 8,928 in 1973. 12 Each of the three essays uses a subsample 
of the main survey in which only those households or individuals 
are included for whom all the required data are available. In each 
essay, the data's validity is discussed by comparing characteristics 
of the subsample to those of the entire sample. In no case did this 
comparison suggest that the subsamples were not representative.
12. A description of the survey is contained in Irelan et a/.(1976). Information on sample 
attrition and more detailed problems with the data are discussed in the tape documentation 
available from the National Archives.
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While the questionnaire used in the survey is not so complete on 
matters of prior earnings and job-related issues as those in several 
other surveys used by economists, it is unique in having both 
detailed data on retirement-related issues and data on income by 
source and expenditure by type. 13 Moreover, it is also unique in its 
restriction to a narrow age cohort of older workers. As such, it 
provides the best available source of information with which to 
analyze the role of unemployment insurance in the lives of older 
Americans.
13. These include the National Longitudinal Surveys, conducted by Ohio State University, 






This chapter focuses on the distribution of unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits among older Americans and the effects of 
this transfer on the distribution of income. There has recently been 
an upswing in interest among policy analysts in the effect of UI 
and other income maintenance schemes on the distribution of 
economic well-being, as measured by total income. Since such 
programs are aimed at least partly at equalizing the income 
distribution, this interest seems well focused. In the UI area, 
Feldstein (1974) presented data that he claimed indicated UI aided 
middle- and upper-income families and thus was disequalizing. 
Hamermesh (1977) showed that these data nonetheless imply that 
UI payments make the distribution of incomes more equal, though 
this does occur because they aid middle-income, not lower-income 
families. Classen (1977) and Feldstein (1977) present evidence 
from other data sets that corroborates this interpretation.
All of the available studies on the distributional effects of UI are 
based on data sets that represent random samples of the entire 
U.S. population. Their comparisons of income distributions may 
thus be misleading, for they are based on differences in current 
incomes among people of different ages, rather than on 
differences in the present values of income over an entire lifetime.' 
Because this study uses a data set that contains individuals of 
roughly the same age, that problem is circumvented.
1. Taussig (1973) and Paglin (1975) have shown that adjusting income distributions to 




The sample of older workers also makes it possible to examine 
more closely the potential impact of the recently enacted federal 
standard that reduces UI benefits by one dollar for each dollar of 
retirement benefits the individual receives. This essay examines 
how much it is likely to reduce the incomes of a typical group of 
older Americans, and how the income reductions are distributed 
across income groups. The only available study of this problem, 
Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978), finds that the restriction 
will sharply reduce the equalizing effects of UI benefits. However, 
because that study included individuals of all ages, its result was 
guaranteed: anything that reduces the incomes of older workers 
will increase inequality in the population as a whole, since older 
workers have lower-than-average incomes because of aging effects 
and smaller investments in education and training. Analysis of this 
question using the sample of older workers should avoid this 
problem and produce better estimates of the effect of this 
restriction on income inequality among people who differ only by 
income, not by both age and income.
This essay first considers the characteristics of the persons 
included in subsamples constructed from the Retirement History 
Survey. Next, it examines how many of their households would 
have suffered reduced benefits had the federal restriction been in 
effect, and how large the reductions would have been. It then 
examines whether UI benefits make the distribution of incomes 
across households more or less equal, and how the restriction 
would have affected the income distribution within this 
population subgroup.
Data and Methods
The Retirement History Survey contains detailed data on 
amounts of income received each year, by source, for each 
household member, so that the distribution of aggregate income 
can be determined and the impact of reductions in UI benefits that 
are linked to the receipt of pension income can be examined. 
Because the data on incomes by source are very unreliable for 
1969, most of the work is based on the data from the 1971 and 
1973 interview waves (1970 and 1972 incomes).
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Incomes of households are examined, not of individuals. This is 
done because it is the household that is the primary consuming 
unit for which economic welfare should be measured. In order to 
assure comparability of the sample between 1971 and 1973, only 
the 8,928 households that were in the sample in both years were 
included in the analysis. Furthermore, in each year, some of the 
data on one or more of the income flows were missing or coded in 
a way inconsistent with the tape documentation, and additional 
observations were deleted from the sample for these reasons. After 
the deletions, the sample consisted of 6,300 households in 1971 
and 6,556 households in 1973, roughly three-fourths of those 
available from the households still in the sample in 1973, but only 
60 percent of those that started in the first wave of this 
longitudinal survey. A combined subsample of 4,862 households 
for which data are available on income flows by type for both 1970 
and 1972 incomes was also formed.
As noted in chapter 1, the Retirement History Survey (RHS) is a 
representative sample of the population of older workers. Because 
the data on income by source are incomplete, it is necessary to use 
subsamples from the RHS for the analyses in this chapter. Are 
these subsamples still representative of the older population? Two 
considerations suggest this question should be answered in the 
affirmative. First, as shown in the next section, both the fraction 
of households in the subsamples that have UI as part of their 
incomes, and the fraction UI represents in total income, appear 
quite close to the respective values for the entire population. 
Second, average household income in 1970 in the first subsample 
was $8,045, and in the second subsample in 1972 it was $8,101. 
This corresponds fairly closely to national statistics for the 
relevant population. 2
2. We use data on male household heads with wife present, unrelated males and unrelated 
females, from Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 80, Table 17, and No. 90, 
Table 19. Using the Retirement History Survey weights for these three groups, we find that, 
among consuming units in which the head (or single individual) was 55-64, income was 
$9,591 in 1970. Our sample was somewhat older than the average person 55-64, so this 
figure corresponds reasonably well to our sample average, especially considering the 
weighted population average was $5,437 for persons 65 and over. In 1972 the weighted 
average for the three groups for household heads (or unrelated individuals) 55-64 was 
$10,811. This is far above our average, but by 1972 the persons in our sample were between
16 Income Distribution
Household income is constructed as the sum of incomes from all 
sources for all household members. 3 In order to analyze the 
potential impact of the pension restrictions, each household 
member's income from UI benefits was reduced by an amount 
equal to his or her pension and Social Security benefits, with the 
maximum reduction equal to the total UI benefit actually received. 
This dollar-for-dollar reduction in UI benefits captures the 
changes that result from the legislative restriction, a reduction that 
cannot decrease UI benefit income below zero. For each 
household in the sample, total income in the presence of the 
restriction would have been the sum of each member's non-UI 
income and the UI benefits left after the restriction is accounted 
for.
As of January 1979, a number of states had reduced UI benefits 
if the claimant received certain pension income or, in a few cases, 
Social Security retirement benefits. The data on UI income 
reported in the Retirement History Survey will, for individuals in 
those states, already reflect the reduction in UI benefits that 
occurred because of restrictions imposed in state legislation as of 
the time of the surveys. The simulations, therefore, show only the 
net impact of imposing the federal restriction contained in the 
1976 UI Amendments in addition to the state restrictions. Thus, 
for example, if it is found that the net effect of the federal 
restriction will be to reduce UI payments to older workers by 50 
percent, one may be sure that the total effect—of the prior state 
and the new federal restrictions—exceeds 50 percent. Similarly, if 
it is found that 30 percent of older workers receiving UI benefits
61 and 66, and their income would be much farther below that of the average person 55-64. 
Indeed, their income appears to be a fairly close approximation to what must be the 
population mean when one considers that the weighted average for the three groups in the 
category age 65 + is $6,405.
3. The original data contain a limit on income by type of $50,000 for each recipient as well 
as $50,000 on each reported aggregation of income. Thus, while our procedure of summing 
all reported income flows to obtain income aggregates rather than relying on the aggregate 
figures in the data should avoid part of the underreporting problem, it does not completely 
vitiate the problem. Nonetheless, in the age cohort used, and for the years 1970 and 1972, it 
is unlikely that very much income received by households in the sample is missed by our 
analysis. Certainly, given limits on UI benefit maxima, no UI benefit income will be 
missed.
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also received retirement income, it may be concluded that a greater 
fraction of UI recipients would have received both types of income 
had there been no state restrictions. 4
The estimates of the net impact of the federal restriction may be 
overstated, since the data reflect twelve-month totals of pensions, 
UI benefits and other income, yet the restriction is based on 
receipts of UI benefits and pensions within one week. Someone in 
the sample could have received UI benefits from January through 
June and pension income from July through December. The 
federal restriction would not affect him, yet in the calculations his 
UI benefits would be reduced dollar-for-dollar. 5 All that can be 
done is to note that this will cause an overestimation of the total 
effect, but not the distributional impact of the restriction.
Total Effects of the Pension Restriction
Before examining the effects of the pension restriction, it is 
necessary to consider whether the estimates of UI income in the 
subsamples are consistent with the known aggregates of UI 
benefits paid out in the two years covered by the survey. Table 
2.1 presents some of the characteristics of the subsamples in each 
of the two years. Roughly 4 percent of the households have 
income from UI in each year, but the average UI income per 
recipient household is much higher in 1972 than in 1970. UI 
income as a fraction of total income in the subsample increased 
from .36 percent in 1970 to .56 percent in 1972. This increase is far 
in excess of what can be explained by the growth in weekly benefit 
amounts, the expansion of coverage, or reduced eligibility 
requirements. Between 1970 and 1972, the average weekly benefit 
paid under the UI program increased by 11 percent, far less than 
the 64 percent increase ($695 to $1,143) in UI incomes per recipient
4. As we saw in chapter 1, though, in January 1979, only a minority of covered 
employment was in states in which both major sources of retirement income—OASI and 
pensions—were disqualifying income under UI. Thus it appears likely that the extent of the 
difference between the gross effect and the net impact of the federal restriction will not be 
very great.
5. Clearly, if the federal restriction were imposed, we would expect many individuals to be 
induced to draw UI and pension benefits in different weeks within a given year.
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household indicated in table 2.1. 6 Further, total UI benefits in 
1970 accounted for .48 percent of personal incomes nationwide; in 
1972 they accounted for only .53 percent. 7 (This increase in UI as a 
fraction of total incomes is likely due to the lingering effects of the 
1970-1971 recession; aggregate unemployment was 4.9 percent of 
the labor force in 1970, 5.6 percent in 1972.) While these figures 
are within the range of those in the third row of table 2.1, they do 
not show the same large increase. There are two possible reasons 
for this discrepancy. First, the older unemployed workers in the 
sample (and, by inference, older unemployed workers in general) 
experience sharply lengthened spells of unemployment as they 
near retirement age. The constancy of the percent of households 
receiving UI benefits in each year suggests that the increased 
importance of this income source as the cohort ages is not 
produced by any increasingly widespread receipt of UI. Second, 
Extended Benefits (EB) were instituted between the two survey 
years. Since these only accrue to workers with long average 
durations of unemployment, and since older workers have 
above-average durations, they would have benefited particularly 
from the enactment of EB.
Table 2.1 also shows that most of the recipients of UI in 1972 
did not receive pension or OASI income in 1970, and thus 
presumably were in the labor force in 1970. Of the household 
heads who received UI benefits in 1972, only 11.9 percent received 
pension income in 1970, compared to 29.4 percent for the entire 
sample. This suggests that UI benefits go disproportionately to 
those older workers who have a continuing labor force 
attachment. They do not go to workers who move off retirement 
income, into work, and then into compensated unemployment: 
only 1.6 percent of all household heads who received retirement 
income in 1970 received UI in 1972. Rather, as the sample cohort 
ages, more and more members of the sampled households appear
6. Calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of UI Financial Statistics, 
1938-1976. It is also likely that the increase was less for older people, as we know from, 
inter alia, Mincer (1974), that earnings, which determine the entitlement, fall between ages 
59-64 and 61-66.
7. Calculated from Ibid, and from Economic Report of the President, 1979.
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to be drawing retirement benefits and UI at the same time. By 
1972, when the household heads in the sample were between 61 
and 66, 48.5 percent of the households in which UI was received 
contained an individual who received both types of income. 
Moreover, 44 percent of household heads who received UI also 
received pension or OASI income in 1972. These estimates are 
quite similar to those produced by the Temporary Extended 
Unemployment Compensation studies in 1961 (cited in chapter 1). 
The data suggest that UI is a cushion for the older worker in the 
process of retirement. It is not a payment that represents part of a 
process of movement from the receipt of retirement income to 
reliance on earnings and work-related transfer income. (In chapter 
4, this process is examined in detail.)
Table 2.1
Selected Characteristics of Households of Older Persons, 1970 and 1972
Characteristic 1970 1972 
All households:
Number 6300 6556 
Percent with UI benefits 4.1 4.0 
UI benefits as a percent of total income .36 .56
Percent with pension or OASI income
received by:
Household head 29.4 52.5 
Spouse 7.7 14.5 
Other household members 1.3 5.0
All households with UI income:
Number 260 260 
Average UI income $695 $1143 
Percent containing persons with
UI and retirement income 26.9 48.5 
Percent with heads having UI in 1972
and pension income in 1970 11.9
Table 2.2 presents the simulated effects of the retirement 
restriction on individuals in the households in the subsamples for
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each of the two years. 8 Not surprisingly, given the increased 
importance of retirement income for these households observed in 
table 2.1, the reduction in UI by retirement income has far greater 
effects in 1972, when the household heads are between 61 and 66 
years old, than in 1970, when they are between 59 and 64. In 1970, 
slightly over one-fourth of the households that received UI income 
would have seen their benefits reduced as a result of the 
restriction, and this would have meant a 27 percent decline in total 
benefits received by households in the sample. In 1972, the same 
restriction would have affected nearly half of all recipient 
households, and total UI benefits received would have been 
reduced by nearly 41 percent. (The figures for 1972 may be slightly 
swollen by early retirement induced by the mild 1970-71 
recession.)
Table 2.2




Reduction in UI benefits as a 
percent of total income .10 .23
All households with UI income
Percent with reduced UI benefits 26.9 48.5
Reduction in UI benefits as a percent 
of total benefits 27.0 40.6
Reduction in UI benefits as a 
percent of total income____ ___ _____2.6____6.0
The main conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the 
retirement-income restriction enacted in the 1976 UI amendments 
will drastically reduce the amount of UI income accruing to
8. To be consistent with the language of P.L. 94-566, we include in retirement income all 
Social Security payments other than Disability Insurance and Survivors' benefits (and 
obviously Medicare) as well as receipts from private pension plans. Income from purchased 
annuities is not included in the measure of retirement income, as it does not appear to come 
under the rubric, "based on the previous work."
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workers in their early and middle 60s, and decrease somewhat less 
sharply the incomes of slightly younger workers. It was estimated 
in chapter 1 that at least $1.5 billion of UI benefits in 1978 accrued 
to individuals age 55 or over. Because the published data do not 
tell what fraction of benefits goes to workers classified by age, the 
simulations of the effect of the retirement income restriction 
cannot produce too accurate an estimate of the income loss 
induced by the restriction. Nonetheless, taking the reduction in UI 
benefits among households headed by persons 59-64 (the 1970 
subsample) to be typical, it is estimated that the restriction would 
have reduced UI benefits received in 1978 by the elderly—and also 
reduced UI taxes—by $400 million. 9
Effects on the Distribution of Income
Table 2.3 presents the distributions of UI benefits and all other 
income by decile of all other income for the 1970, 1972, and 
combined subsamples. 10 The income is slightly more equally 
distributed in the combined subsample than in either of the two 
individual subsamples. For example, in the combined subsample 
the share of income accruing to households in the highest decile is 
30.33 percent, as opposed to 31.47 percent in the 1970 subsample, 
and 30.92 percent in the 1972 subsample. Similarly, households in 
the lowest decile of other income received 1.36 percent of all other 
income in the combined subsample, but only 1.13 percent and 1.34 
percent in the 1970 and 1972 samples respectively. The greater 
equality of income distribution in the combined subsample, for 
which the data are in essence an average of two years of income, 
results from the averaging out of extreme random variations.
Consider now the distributions of UI benefits across households 
ranked by income deciles. In each year, and in the two subsamples
9. This figure is calculated as $1.5 billion times .27, the reduction in UI benefits in the 1970 
sample.
10. For purposes of analyzing the distributional impact of UI benefits in this sample of 
older workers, we use an expanded definition of income that adds 6 percent of the net value 
of owner-occupied housing to other income flows. This adjustment makes our income 
measure more comparable to those used in the Feldstein (1974) and Ehrenberg, Hutchens, 
and Smith (1978) studies.
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combined, households in the lowest decile receive disproportion 
ately small shares of total UI payments compared to their shares 
of all other income. 11 (This is not surprising, for the household 
heads in the lowest income decile are unlikely to have worked 
recently, and thus are unlikely to be eligible for UI benefits.) By 
the eighth (third lowest) decile, this is reversed: shares in total UI 
exceed shares in all other income. This continues until the third 
income decile (the second in the combined sample), at which point 
shares in total UI benefits begin to fall below shares in all other 
income. In summary, households in the lowest income decile 
receive a less than proportionate share of UI benefits, as do 
households in the highest deciles, while those households between 
the third through ninth deciles receive more than proportionate 
shares of UI.
The effect of UI benefits on the distribution of income can be 
seen more clearly by considering figures 1 through 3. The solid 
curved line in each graphs the relation between the cumulative 
percent of UI benefits and the cumulative percent of all other 
income. If households in each income decile received the same 
share of UI benefits as they did of all other income, the line would 
be diagonal; if households in the lowest decile received all the UI 
income, the line would follow the left and top edges of the box; if 
households in the highest decile received all UI benefits, it would 
follow the bottom and right edges of the box. In short, UI benefits 
equalize the distribution of income if the solid line lies above the 
diagonal.
The figures show that in fact the solid lines do lie above the 
diagonal in all three samples. UI benefits are equalizing, in the 
sense that on net they are received by individuals who receive a 
less-than-proportionate share of all other income. Even when 
variations in income resulting from life-cycle behavior and secular 
improvements in the quality of education and training are 
accounted for by using a sample that is nearly homogeneous in 
age, UI benefits are still found to equalize the income distribution
11. This result is similar to that of Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978) for a random 
sample of families, and it is also similar to the phenomenon underlying the data presented 
by Feldstein (1974), though it does not support the interpretation he drew from those data.
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by providing aid disproportionately to lower-middle and 
middle-income individuals. 12
Table 2.3
Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits and All Other Income in Older 


































































































a. Based on non-UI income.
Summary statistics calculated for the three samples (shown in 
Appendix A) suggest less equalization of income than that 
reported by Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978). This may be 
the result of differences in the definitions of income, but it may 
also be produced by the homogeneity in age in the survey. Because 
the sample does not include the high wage earners ages 40 to 54
12. This conclusion is corroborated by similar calculations on the sample's 1968 income. 
(Although the poor data on retirement incomes prevent our simulating the effect of the 
federal restrictions, the UI benefits appear to be usable.) The degree of inequality in a 
graph for 1968 analogous to figures 1-3 is greater than that for 1970 or 1972. That the 
income-equalizing effect of UI benefits is strongest in 1968 is not surprising: only 3.4 
percent of households reported receiving UI income in that high-employment year when the 
few unemployed are disproportionately low-skilled, low-wage workers.
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Figure 1
Cumulative Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, With and Without
Retirement-Income Restriction, and All Other Income, 1970
Percent of 
benefits
Percent of all other income
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Figure 2
Cumulative Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, With and Without





Percent of all other income
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Figure 3
Cumulative Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, With and Without




Percent of all other income
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who are at the peak of their earnings profiles and who are unlikely 
to be unemployed, the comparisons of the distributions of benefits 
and income automatically remove some of the equalizing effect. 
Nonetheless, even with the removal of this additional life-cycle 
phenomenon, it is still found that UI benefits equalize the income 
distribution.
Perhaps the biggest anomaly in the results is the sharply reduced 
equalizing effect of benefits in 1972, when the household heads 
were between ages 61 and 66, as compared to 1970, when they 
were ages 59-64. (Notice that the solid line in figure 2 lies much 
closer to the diagonal than it does in figure 1.) The likeliest 
explanation for this is suggested by the data in table 2.1 showing 
that the percentage of respondents with pension income jumped 
from 29 to 52 percent in this two year period, a clear reflection of 
the increased fraction of the sample reaching age 65. As the 
bottom line of table 2.4 shows, the number of households drawing 
most of their income from pensions and OASI—those in which the 
head is no longer attached to the labor force—also increased. 13 
With it, the number of households in which members are unlikely 
to have received UI benefits must have increased as well, given UI 
eligibility requirements. If these households had not saved enough 
to produce retirement incomes sufficient to maintain their prior 
living standard, their incomes upon retirement would have placed 
them relatively low in the income distribution in their age cohort. 
This is precisely what can be observed in table 2.4—the percentage 
of households whose income consists chiefly of retirement income 
decreases almost steadily as one moves up the income distribution. 
Thus the fraction of UI benefits accruing to lower-income 
members of the cohort that are fully retired decreases, for an 
increased proportion of lower-income households could not have 
been receiving UI benefits.
13. A similar pattern is shown if table 2.4 is recalculated for all households whose 
retirement income exceeds 50 percent of the total. In 1970 this was true for 14.5 percent of 
the households; in 1972, for 32.2 percent.
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Table 2.4
Percentage of Households with Retirement Income at Least 75 Percent
of Total Income, by Sample Decile of Total Income, 1970 and 1972




































Having shown that UI benefits equalize incomes, even 
abstracting from life-cycle considerations, the remaining task is to 
examine the effect of the proposed restriction on UI benefits for 
those who also receive retirement income. Table 2.5 presents the 
distributions of UI benefits by decile of other income, both before 
and after adjustment for the retirement-income restriction. The 
dotted lines in figures 1-3 relate the cumulative shares of UI 
benefits, after adjustment for the restriction, to the cumulative 
shares of all other income. For the 1970 and combined 
subsamples, summary statistics (see Appendix A) suggest that the 
restriction equalizes the distribution of incomes within this age 
cohort still further. For 1972 the opposite is true: the statistics 
indicate that, while UI benefits are still equalizing in this 
subsample of 61 to 66 year olds, their effect is less equalizing than 
in the absence of the retirement-income restriction.
This difference in the results between the two years can be 
examined in more detail by comparing the graphs of the pairs of 
distributions in figures 1-3. The dotted line in figures 1 and 3 lies 
uniformly above the solid line that shows the actual relationship 
(without the restriction). In these two sets of results, the restriction 
is uniformly equalizing: each lower group in the income
Table 2.5
Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, Before and After the Retirement-Income Restriction, by Sample Decile of
Other Income, 1970, 1972, and Combined Subsamples


































































































distribution receives a greater share of UI benefits when the 
restriction is applied than when it is not.
The same is obviously not true for 1972, as figure 2 shows. 
Nevertheless, from the lowest up to and including the sixth decile 
of the income distribution, the curve in figure 2 showing the 
distribution of UI benefits with the restriction lies above the curve 
without the restriction. While on net the restriction reduces the 
equalizing effect of UI, it does increase the share of UI benefits 
accruing to households in the bottom half of the distribution of 
incomes among households headed by persons ages 61-66. This 
equalizing effect is more than offset by the reductions in the shares 
accruing to households in the higher (second through fifth) 
deciles, and the large increase in the share of UI benefits going to 
the highest decile when the pension restriction is applied.
Why does the sharp difference in the results between 1970 and 
1972 arise? One cannot be entirely sure, but it is likely that the 
same phenomenon is at work here that produced the much smaller 
equalizing effect of UI benefits in 1972 as compared to 1970 that 
was shown in table 2.3. The highest two deciles in the income 
distribution in 1972 contain relatively few families in which an 
individual is still partly attached to the labor force yet also 
receiving some retirement income. In the next three lower deciles, 
more individuals are apparently both receiving retirement income 
and are partly attached to the labor force and thus eligible for UI 
benefits when unemployed. That this difference occurs reflects the 
apparent shortsightedness of savers, shown by the lower position 
in the income distribution in table 2.4 of those whose incomes are 
composed to a large degree of pension and other income resulting 
from savings. Thus when the restriction is imposed, it is 
households that have moderate incomes but receive substantial 
amounts of both UI and retirement incomes that are hit most 
severely, while the highest decile of households, containing as it 
does relatively few recipients of retirement income, is only slightly 
affected. 14 The lower half of the income distribution is also not so
14. Households in the highest income decile would suffer a reduction in UI benefits as a 
result of the pension restriction, but they would still receive 81 percent of the UI benefits 
they get without the restriction. This compares to a sample average of only 59 percent in 
1972.
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greatly affected because, as table 2.4 shows, so many individuals 
in it are completely retired that they are not likely to remain 
eligible for UI. These same facts did not affect the results so 
strongly in the 1970 sample, for the incidence of receipt of 
retirement income was much lower when the sample was two years 
younger.
Summary and Implications
In this chapter, a number of aspects of the effect of UI 
payments on the distribution of incomes among households 
headed by older individuals have been examined. Using data from 
the Retirement History Survey, it has been found that : (1) UI 
benefits make the distribution of income more equal than it would 
have been had no benefits been paid; (2) the restriction on 
retirement income would reduce UI benefits received by 
households headed by persons 59-64 years old by 27 percent, and 
by 41 percent among households headed by persons 61-66 years of 
age; and (3) the retirement-income restriction would make the 
distribution of incomes more equal across households headed by 
persons age 59-64. In a sample composed of two years' income of 
persons ages 59-64 in one year and 61-66 two years later, the same 
result is observed. Only in a sample restricted to one year's income 
of households headed by persons 61-66 years old would the 
retirement-income restriction make the income distribution less 
equal.
These results shed new light on the effects of UI payments on 
the income distribution. When one accounts for differences in 
life-cycle behavior by confining the analysis to a relatively narrow 
age group, one finds that the payment of UI benefits makes the 
distribution of income more equal within that age group. It does 
this by decreasing the income shares of the highest three deciles 
and increasing those of households in the third through ninth 
deciles. Results obtained in previous studies that failed to account 
for life-cycle effects, a problem that seriously affects comparisons
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of income distributions, remain valid when this failure is 
remedied. 15
In the group of 61 to 66 year olds, the disequalizing effect of the 
retirement-income restriction occurs because the highest-income 
group is aided at the expense of the upper middle-income groups. 
Even in this sample, though, households in the lower half of the 
income distribution improve their relative position as a result of 
the restriction. This observation, coupled with the results for the 
combined subsamples in which extremes in income are averaged 
out, suggests that the pension restriction might be on net an 
equalizing force on the distribution of income within the cohort of 
older households. At the very least, these results are quite 
inconsistent with the notion that the restriction would decrease 
income equality. They seem to contradict the finding of 
Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978), based on a sample of 
households of all ages.
Unemployment insurance is an income maintenance program. 
Any change in its structure should be examined for its impact on 
the income distribution, since the major goal of such programs is 
to preserve living standards. To view it in this light produces a 
quandary. On the one hand, the retirement-income restriction 
would increase, or at least not reduce, income equality among the 
older population. On the other hand, older workers are generally 
less well-off than the average worker. The restriction would, by 
reducing incomes solely among households headed by older 
workers, decrease income equality in the population as a whole. 16 
Repealing the restriction would maintain the UI system as a 
vehicle for redistributing income toward the elderly, albeit the 
higher-income elderly.
15. For example, Paglin (1975) shows that in 1972 one-third of the inequality implicit in 
data on the income distribution resulted from differences in ages of the households. 
Because of changes in the age structure of the U.S. population, this effect had grown from 
roughly 20 percent in 1947.
16. The reduction in UI benefits would reduce UI taxes. In the absence of any information 
about tax incidence for such taxes, we make the standard assumption that the rise in 
after-tax incomes is proportionate across the population, and thus does not affect our 
measures of the percentage distribution of other income.
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Taking the long view and considering the distribution of 
incomes over the lifetime of a population cohort, one should, 
though, ignore this consideration of intergenerational equity: 
repeal of the restriction would aid groups late in their lives who are 
better off throughout their lives. That they happen to be poorer, 
on average, late in life than their children should be an irrelevant 
consideration for a program that does not specifically have as its 
goal the maintenance of incomes among the older population. 
Considering only the issue of the effects on the distribution of 
income, the retirement-income restriction is beneficial in that it 
will probably make the distribution of lifetime incomes more 
equal. If one wishes to raise incomes among older persons, there 








Disqualifying pensioners from receiving UI benefits, or 
reducing their benefits, could have a detrimental impact on their 
well-being if their consumption is seriously affected by the 
disqualification. It is, after all, the living standard—consump 
tion—of the population that has been a major focus of social 
insurance since its inception. For example, in the debate before the 
establishment of the UI system in the thirties, one leading observer 
noted, "Provision for those whose income has ceased because of 
unemployment will constitute a major problem of practical 
economics for years to come." 1 In his message to Congress 
transmitting Social Security legislation, President Roosevelt 
stated, "Among our objectives I place the security of men, women 
and children of this Nation first. . . . They want some safeguard 
against misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in this 
man-made world of ours." 2 Indeed, the preamble to the bill that 
eventually became the Social Security Act stated that it was 
designed "to alleviate the hazards of old age, unemployment." 3 
Haber and Murray (1966, chapter 2) state that the prime objective 
of UI is the prevention of hardship caused by job and wage loss.
This chapter considers how the older household will respond to 
unemployment by changing its consumption. Within the context
1. Eveline M. Burns, "The Economics of Unemployment Relief," American Economic 
Review, 23, March 1933.
2. Message of June 8, 1934.
3. 74th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 4142, submitted by Representative David Lewis on 
January 17, 1935.
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36 UI and Consumption
of the standard economic view of consumption, it presents an 
analysis of how UI benefits will be spent and whether benefits 
received by a household in which someone is unemployed will be 
spent differently from the household's usual source of income. 
Such analysis will make it possible to deduce the fraction of older 
households for which benefits are adequate in the following sense: 
does the household receive sufficient benefits or have access to 
prior savings or to borrowed funds that enable it to maintain 
consumption at the level it would have had a household member 
not been unemployed? Since the likelihood that a household has 
past savings or can borrow may depend upon its income, there is 
also an examination of whether benefit adequacy varies with the 
household's income level attained before the spell of unemploy 
ment started.
The estimates of benefit adequacy and its correlates are all made 
from subsamples of the Retirement History Survey (RHS), using 
consumption data from 1970 and 1972. In addition, the RHS 
provides data on expenditures for several different spending 
categories by households in which the heads are roughly the same 
age, making it possible to examine the types of items that UI 
recipients consume disproportionately and those on which 
additional UI benefits are spent. The results of these examinations 
can be used to determine whether the living standards of older 
recipients will be severely hurt by the restriction on UI benefits 
received by pensioners, since it can be inferred whether a 
significant proportion of older households already find benefits 
inadequate.
How Will UI Benefits Affect Consumption?
The economic theory of consumption is based on the view that 
people have a good idea of their lifetime incomes and the length of 
time they intend to be working during their lives. 4 In its simplest
4. The theory of consumption generally accepted by economists is that of Friedman (1957). 
Its major implications are that increases in income that are expected to persist will have a 
nearly one-for-one effect on current consumption, while those that are considered 
temporary will have only a minute effect on consumption today. The notion that some 
individuals must adjust consumption because of an inability to borrow has been discussed
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form the theory states that individuals will save enough during 
their work lives to ensure that their consumption does not drop 
during their retirement. If members of the Jones household expect 
to work 40 years and live 10 years in retirement, and income is 
$10,000 per year while working, the household will, according to 
the theory, consume $8,000 per year in each year of its life. This 
means that the Joneses will save $2,000 per year during the work 
lives of their members, so that they have enough savings to keep 
consumption at $8,000 per year during retirement. (This example 
ignores any interest that may be earned on savings, or any 
preference the household may have for consumption today over 
consumption in the future. These are complications that do not 
qualitatively affect the conclusions drawn.)
Consider what happens if in one year the household's income 
drops to $5,000, and in the next year it rises (for that year only) to 
$15,000. The household's lifetime income has not changed; if it 
can borrow or dip into savings in the first year, it will maintain 
consumption at $8,000. Similarly, in the second of these two years 
it will save $7,000 or repay loans. The main point is that, given the 
rationality of smoothing consumption over the household's 
lifetime, transitory variations in income will not greatly affect 
consumption. 5 Instead, consumption will be affected by the 
household's permanent, or average income per year of its life.
Clearly, this theory is highly refined; as with most theories, one 
can criticize it as being too abstract, unable to account for quirks 
of individual behavior, or overly simplified. These criticisms are 
correct. Yet, the theory has been powerful enough to explain such 
diverse phenomena as: (1) The post-1945 economic boom, an 
expansion that occurred when most people expected a return to the 
Depression as wartime military spending ended; (The boom
by Tobin and Dolde (1971). Its implications for spending out of UI benefits are derived in
Hamermesh (1979), and, for the behavior of the unemployed generally, by Flemming
(1978).
5. That smoothing consumption is rational is demonstrated in extreme form by the
following consideration: most persons would rather consume $20,000 worth of goods with
certainty than have a 20 percent chance of consuming $100,000 and an 80 percent chance of
consuming nothing.
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occurred because people's lifetime income had increased during 
the World War II boom, yet consumption had not because of 
wartime rationing.) and (2) The reduction in private saving 
induced by the advent of Social Security, with its provision of 
public saving for retirement. 6 Other examples can also be offered. 
Rather than discussing them, consider what the theory implies 
about the relation between consumption and UI benefits.
How would the Jones family respond to the receipt of $1,000 in 
UI benefits during the year in which its other income is only 
$5,000? As noted earlier, because it could borrow or dip into prior 
savings, its consumption would have been $8,000 that year even if 
no benefits had been received. The $1,000 does raise the 
household's lifetime income; but, assuming the household 
attempts to smooth income over its life, the effect on consumption 
during the period when the benefits are received is tiny. For the 
Joneses, who are able to borrow or dip into past savings, the UI 
benefits represent a transitory increase in income that, like other 
such increases, raises consumption slightly each year of the 
household's remaining life.
Now consider the Cohens, a household identical to the Joneses, 
except that they cannot borrow and have no savings to draw upon 
during the year when their income is only $5,000. Even though 
their lifetime income is the same as the Joneses', their 
consumption is drastically reduced, from $8,000 to $5,000 during 
that year. How will they spend the $1,000 of UI benefits? In their 
case it would make sense to spend every penny of it. Even if they 
do this, their consumption will only be $6,000, far less than the 
$8,000 of goods consumed in earlier years of their lives or than the 
$8,000 consumed later. Spending the entire $1,000 helps to smooth 
consumption across the household's life. If they saved part of it 
they would increase consumption during later periods, when it is 
already high, at the expense of current consumption, when it is 
abnormally low.
6. For example, see the theoretical arguments, empirical evidence, and references in 
Munnell (1976).
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For the Joneses, it may be concluded that UI benefits are more 
than adequate as judged by the objective standard of how they are 
spent. Because the Joneses can borrow or dip into savings, the UI 
benefits are hardly spent at all. The story is different for the 
Cohens: they spend all the UI benefits they receive. Furthermore, 
even if they get $3,000 in benefits, they would spend it all, for they 
would still then be consuming only $8,000 per year. For the 
Cohens, the $1,000 in UI benefits are inadequate, in the sense that 
the amount is insufficient to enable them to maintain their 
standard of living (at $8,000 per year). The benefits are inadequate 
both because they are meager compared to the size of the lost 
income, but also because the household, for whatever reasons, 
does not have access to borrowed funds or past savings.
The view of benefit adequacy implicit in this discussion is 
fundamentally different from that contained in the many studies 
of the subject. 7 In these works, the authors identify certain 
expenditure categories as being "necessary and obligated" or 
"nondeferrable" and define benefit adequacy in terms of the 
fraction of such expenditures that other income and UI benefits 
can cover. One difficulty with that method is that it is necessarily 
arbitrary in its selection of commodities. Also, it ignores the 
possibility that households that dip into savings to meet periods of 
unemployment are not facing hardship, but are instead using 
savings that were set aside in the expectation of future 
unemployment. For such households, there is no hardship from 
unemployment, for they are able to maintain their standard of 
living. Benefits would be considered inadequate for such 
households in the existing benefit adequacy literature; by the 
criterion of this study, though, they are more than adequate, since 
the household has its own means of maintaining its consumption.
One obviously cannot take households out of a sample of data 
and point out some as being more like the Joneses and others as 
more like the Cohens. However, the discussion suggests that
7. Becker (1961) analyzed the behavior of households surveyed by the Department of 
Labor in the studies of the 1950s. Blaustein and Mackin (1977) extended the work using 
data for South Carolina. Burgess and Kingston (1978) conducted a major benefit adequacy 
study in Arizona using econometric techniques not used in the earlier studies.
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households for which benefits are adequate or more than adequate 
will spend each extra dollar of UI benefits to the same extent they 
would spend an extra dollar of transitory income. Spending 
propensities out of UI benefits will be low for them. Households 
for which benefits are inadequate will spend 100 percent of each 
extra dollar of benefits. In the entire sample, the propensity to 
spend out of UI benefits will be a weighted average of the 
consumption behavior of households like the Joneses and the 
Cohens. If UI benefits are spent dollar-for-dollar by the average 
household, it may be inferred that most households are like the 
Cohens and find benefits inadequate; if UI benefits are largely 
spent in the same partial way as is transitory income, it may be 
inferred that most households, like the Joneses, find benefits at 
least adequate.
In addition to allowing an estimate of the fraction of 
households for which benefits are inadequate, this approach also 
allows an examination of whether the likelihood that benefits are 
inadequate varies with identifiable characteristics. In particular, 
the theory stated that households that can borrow easily or that 
have prior savings are less likely to find benefits inadequate. Since 
a cushion of savings and access to loanable funds are likely to be 
greater among higher-income households, the study examines 
whether spending propensities out of UI are more like those of the 
Joneses among higher-income households that receive UI benefits.
Using this approach, it is possible to form some hypotheses 
about how UI benefits will affect the consumption of different 
goods and services. The recipient household that must reduce its 
consumption is faced with the choice of which items to cut back 
on. If its members are logical, they will reduce spending on those 
goods that were added to their consumption as their living 
standards rose. One should expect UI recipients who face reduced 
living standards (for whom benefits were inadequate) mainly to 
reduce their consumption of luxuries. Comparing UI recipient 
households to others, a larger share of total consumption among 
UI recipient households would be expected to go for necessities, 
and a smaller share for luxuries. While the identification of 
luxuries and necessities could be arbitrary, this arbitrariness is
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avoided by identifying as luxuries those goods whose consumption 
increases more than proportionally as average household income 
rises, and necessities as those whose consumption rises less than 
proportionally. 8
Just as UI recipients are likely to reduce spending most on 
luxuries, they will respond to additional UI benefits by attempting 
to restore their spending on those items—luxuries—that they cut 
out during the period of reduced consumption. It is expected that 
propensities to spend out of UI benefits will be greatest on luxury 
items, smallest on necessities. Paradoxically, UI benefits will be 
spent mostly on luxuries, even where recipient households suffer 
reduced living standards during times of unemployment.
These considerations suggest several conclusions about the 
likely effects of the federal restriction on the receipt of UI by 
pensioners. First, if it is found that UI benefits are inadequate for 
a substantial fraction of recipient households, it may be concluded 
that the fraction would have been higher had the restriction been 
in effect. Second, if the likelihood that benefits are inadequate is 
greatest for low-income households, this would reduce arguments 
against the retirement-income restriction. Chapter 2 showed that 
the restriction would reduce benefits least among low-income 
households. Finally, if the data confirm the hypotheses about the 
pattern of spending out of additional UI benefits, the restriction 
can be expected to induce even sharper cutbacks in purchases of 
luxury goods by recipient households, as their total income would 
be reduced still further when they are unemployed.
Data and Simple Comparisons of 
UI Recipient Households and Others
The analysis is based on data from subsamples of households 
from the Retirement History Survey responses for 1971 and 1973 
(income and spending for 1970 and 1972). For the data covering
8. In what follows, we measure the income elasticity of demand for each commodity, the 
percentage response of spending to a 1 percent increase in income, other things equal. 
The designation of luxuries as those with income elasticities above one, and necessities as 
those elasticities below one, is standard parlance.
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1970 income and consumption, only 3,188 households met the 
criterion of having complete and usable information required for 
the analysis; for 1972,2,458 households met this criterion. Despite 
the very large fraction of households for which data were not 
usable in this analysis (remember, 8,928 households were included 
in the 1972 RHS), the remaining subsample appears to be fairly 
representative of the original sample. In the 1970 subsample, for 
example, 90.0 percent of the households are white, 61.9 are 
headed by a married male, and 28.8 are headed by a married 
female. For the original RHS panel of 11,153 households, the 
comparable percentages are 90.0, 60.5 and 28.7, a remarkably 
close correspondence. In the subsample for 1972, the figures are 
91.7 percent, 63.6 percent and 26.6 percent, indicating a somewhat 
greater proportional representation among whites and households 
headed by married males. That this occurs is expected: incomplete 
responses are least likely among those groups with higher incomes 
and higher socioeconomic status, so that whites and two-person 
households are more likely to be represented increasingly in the 
sample as it ages.
Table 3.1 presents the means and their standard deviations for a 
number of household characteristics separately for UI recipient 
households and others in the two subsamples. Several of the 
measures require some explanation. Non-UI income after taxes 
consists of income from all sources other than UI benefits, 
adjusted for Social Security and federal personal income taxes. 9 
To this sum is added an imputed income from the net value 
(market value minus mortgage) on owner-occupied housing. 10 The 
"partly retired" and "fully retired" categories are based on the 
household head's response to a question that asks him to appraise 
his retirement status. It is thus subjective, but probably reflective
9. The income figures used are an approximation to disposable income, derived by 
applying the relevant year's data on actual effective rates of the federal personal income 
tax, and data on Old Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance payroll tax rates and 
ceilings, to all income flows other than UI and retirement income. (See U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, Statistics of Income, 1968, 1970, 1972.)
10. The imputation assumes a 6 percent return on the homeowner's equity. While low by 
today's standards, this was reasonable in the early 1970s.
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Table 3.1
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a. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
b. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable.
c. Includes gasoline in 1972.
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of how close an attachment to the labor force he has, at least as 
compared to the alternative response, "not retired."
Before comparing the sample means of the characteristics for 
the two groups of households in each subsample, it is worth noting 
that the amount of UI benefits per recipient household in the 1970 
subsample is almost identical to the $695 for the (larger) 1970 
subsample used in chapter 2. The same measure for the 1972 
subsample is smaller here than the $1,143 reported in table 2.1; 
however, the difference is not quite significant given the size of the 
standard deviation of the mean benefits. 11 These considerations 
reinforce the conclusion about the representativeness of these 
subsamples.
Despite the small size of the sample of UI recipient households, 
significant differences are found between the means of some of 
their characteristics and those of households that do not contain 
UI recipients. For example, in both subsamples the households in 
which someone receives UI are significantly more likely to be 
headed by a married male, significantly less likely to be headed by 
a single female, and (inferentially) equally likely to be headed by a 
single male. That households headed by married men comprise a 
disproportionate share of UI recipient households in the sample is 
not surprising: such households are much more likely to contain 
more than one person, and thus more than one potential UI 
recipient. What is interesting is that households headed by single 
males have roughly the same shares among UI recipient 
households and others, while those headed by single females are 
underrepresented among UI recipient households. This corrob 
orates data on the entire UI program for individual recipients 
showing women to be a smaller fraction of recipients than of the 
labor force (see Hamermesh 1977, p. 22).
11. The standard deviation for the test of the difference between two sample means is:
where N, and N 2 are the numbers of observations in each sample, and Si and S: are the 
standard deviations of the means in each sample.
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In the 1972 subsample, the heads of UI recipient households are 
significantly younger than those of other households. This 
undoubtedly reflects the increased likelihood of withdrawal from 
the labor force (and thus the lesser likelihood that the household 
head is eligible for UI benefits) as the head ages. They are also less 
likely than others to report themselves as fully retired, again 
probably reflecting the fact that the fully retired person is not 
likely to have established eligibility for UI based on recent prior 
work. That many UI recipients do state they are fully retired may 
reflect such work or it may just reflect fuzziness in responses to the 
question in the survey. What is interesting, though, and crucial to 
the consideration of the restriction on the receipt of UI by 
pensioners, is that the heads of households that receive UI income 
are more likely than others to report themselves as partly retired. 
This relationship, which is considered in much more detail in 
chapter 4, suggests that a substantial amount of UI benefits 
accruing to older workers goes to those with a fairly weak labor 
force attachment.
For 1972, the original data allow the construction of 
observations on spending on food, transportation and gasoline, 
vacations and trips, and housing. 12 While data on other categories 
would be nice to have, they are not available in the RHS in usable 
form. Together these four consumption categories comprised 48 
percent of average after-tax income in the sample. The same 
fraction of after-tax income is spent by both groups on these four 
categories combined. However, table 3.1 shows that UI recipients 
allocate a substantially greater fraction of their total income to
12. Expenditures on food were calculated by multiplying by 52 the respondent's reported 
usual weekly expenditures on food, as was spending on transportation. (The use of usual 
expenditures circumvents any problems of seasonality.) Gasoline expenditures were 
estimated by multiplying by 12 the reported monthly spending. "Housing" spending is an 
amalgam of blown-up monthly rent or mortgage and taxes, plus annual spending on 
utilities and other housing services, plus 6 percent of the net value of owner-occupied 
housing. Finally, vacations and trips expenditure is the amount the respondent reported as 
spending on this category. Clearly, these categories are not consistent with one another, but 
they appear to be the most sensible, given the way the data are reported in the Survey. To 
the extent there are errors in the reporting of these data, the significance of our results will 
be reduced; conversely, if we find significant results, we may infer that the errors are not 
too serious.
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transportation and gasoline. This difference, though probably not 
significant, is what one would expect if the UI recipients devote a 
large part of their time to job search that involves the use of autos 
or public transportation. 13 Conversely, they spend proportionately 
less on vacations and trips. Of course, these percentages may 
differ because average incomes differ between UI recipient 
households and others. The regression analysis of the next section 
will examine this issue.
The consumption data for 1970 contained so many errors in the 
category for food expenditure that only three commodity groups 
could be used—transportation, vacations and trips, and housing 
expenditures. (With the exception of the deletion of gasoline from 
the first of these three, the categories are measured exactly as in 
the 1972 data.) Table 3.1 shows the shares of these three categories 
in the after-tax incomes of UI recipients and others: spending as a 
fraction of total income is again about the same in both groups, 
and again UI recipients spend proportionately more on 
transportation and less on vacations and trips.
One might well object that the small number of recipient 
households and likely errors in reporting of consumption by 
category make any inferences from these data very shaky. The 
validity of this objection is testable: if it is found that there are 
systematic differences between spending propensities out of UI 
and other income, or that consumption as measured is related to 
income, it may be inferred that the data are reliable.
The major goal of this chapter is to deduce from the data the 
fraction of older households whose propensity to spend out of UI 
benefits implies that the benefits are inadequate for them. To do 
that, it is necessary to estimate relationships, through multiple 
regression equations, of each household's spending for each 
category to its income from UI benefits and all other sources. The
13. Barren and Mellow (1979) find that UI recipients spend less time engaged in job search 
than do other unemployed workers. However, since the overwhelming majority of people 
in our sample who do not receive UI benefits are also not unemployed, and presumably not 
searching, we may conclude that the average UI recipient spends more time searching for 
work that the average person in the sample.
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coefficients from these regressions are in fact the marginal 
propensities to spend out of income from the particular source.
The previous section of this essay suggested that the fraction of 
households for which spending is inadequate can be inferred by 
comparing spending propensities out of UI to those out of 
permanent and transitory income. These two theoretical concepts 
are hard to measure in practice; however, having several years of 
data on incomes in each household makes it possible to attempt 
such measurement. Essentially, it is assumed that permanent 
income in nonrecipient households is the average of income in the 
current year and that observed when the subsample was 
interviewed two years earlier. Thus, for example, for the 1970 
subsample, it is the average of the household's incomes in 1968 
and 1970. Transitory income is then estimated as the deviation of 
actual from permanent income. The procedure is more complex 
for UI recipient households, as shown in Appendix B, but it is 
based on the same idea.
For each nonrecipient household, there are measures of 
permanent and transitory income; for each recipient household, 
there are these plus a measure of its UI benefits. These measures 
can then be used in the regression analysis to estimate the spending 
propensities to be examined. (The exact equations used are shown 
in Appendix B.) Because it is likely that the choice of how much to 
spend on different items is affected as well by factors other than 
the various income flows, a number of demographic and 
work-status variables are also included in the estimating 
equations. Demographic variables include the household head's 
race, sex, marital status and age, and the number of children living 
in the household. Included as work-status measures are variables 
indicating whether the head is fully retired, partly retired, or not 
retired. Clearly, other control variables might be included, and, in 
fact, others were tried. As the results for them in Appendix B 
suggest, though, these particular variables are important in 
explaining variations among households in patterns of con 
sumption.
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Evidence on the Effect of UI 
and Other Income on Consumption
Before discussing the estimates of spending propensities out of 
permanent and transitory income, spending propensities among 
UI recipient households should be considered. Table 3.2 presents 
the estimated marginal propensities to spend in each category out 
of UI and other income. In addition, marginal spending 
propensities on the total of the several categories are also included. 
In both 1970 and 1972, propensities to spend out of UI are found 
to exceed those out of other income in most cases. It was noted 
earlier that spending out of UI by households for which benefits 
are inadequate will exceed marginal spending propensities out of 
permanent income, while, for households for which UI is 
adequate, spending propensities out of UI will be lower. Since the 
estimated propensities to spend out of UI on all categories 
combined are fairly large compared to those out of other income, 
it may be concluded that at least some fraction of the recipient 
households finds UI benefits inadequate. It is also worth noting 
that, despite the relatively small number of households receiving 
UI, many of the marginal spending propensities are positive and 
are significantly different from zero. This should enhance one's 
confidence in the reliability of the data, and thus in the results of 
estimates using these data, as it implies that the consumption data 
are not simply random.
Table 3.3 presents the estimates of the propensities to spend out 
of permanent and transitory income in each year for all 
households in the subsamples. Some comment is required about 
the estimated spending propensities themselves. As the theory 
predicts, spending propensities out of permanent income exceed 
those out of transitory income, suggesting that these are measured 
with some accuracy. Worth noting too are some interesting 
differences between the marginal propensities and the shares of 
income spent on each commodity that were shown in table 3.1. 
Even though transportation (transportation and gasoline in 1972) 
takes a larger share of after-tax income than do vacations and 
trips, marginal propensities to spend on vacations and trips are
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greater. This is consistent with the expectation that vacations are a 
luxury good that becomes more important only as income 
increases. An even stronger comparison between food and 
vacations in the 1972 subsample reinforces this point.
Table 3.2
Estimates of Marginal Spending Propensities Out of UI and Other
Income, UI Recipient Households, 1970 and 1972





























































a. t-statistics, ratios of the spending propensities to their standard errors, are in parentheses
below the estimated spending propensities.
b. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable.
c. Includes gasoline in 1972.
*The spending propensity is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
The major points of interest and probably the most important 
findings of this chapter are the estimates of the fractions of 
households whose spending out of UI suggests that benefits are 
inadequate. In the 1970 subsample, it is estimated that hardly any 
of the households find benefits inadequate; only 5 percent of the 
UI recipient households appear to spend as if UI benefits were 
inadequate. In the 1972 subsample, it is estimated that 60 percent 
of UI recipient households spend as if benefits were inadequate.
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(See Appendix B for a discussion of the derivation of these 
estimates.) These estimates are substantially different, probably 
because of the relatively few households with UI income in the 
subsamples. They do suggest, though, that perhaps a majority of 
older UI recipient households finds benefits adequate in the sense 
that UI benefits, together possibly with prior savings and 
borrowed funds, are sufficient to prevent consumption from 
declining. They also imply that a reduction in UI benefits for 
pensioners will not reduce the living standards of almost a 
majority of older households in the sample, or, by inference, in 
the entire population.
Table 3.3
Estimates of Marginal Spending Propensities, Out of Permanent and
Transitory Income, All Households, 1970 and 1972
Marginal propensity to spend out of: a


























































a. t-statistics, ratios of the spending propensities to their standard errors, are in parentheses
below the estimated spending propensities.
b. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable.
c. Includes gasoline in 1972.
*The spending propensity is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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While it is interesting to know the percentage of households that 
appear to have inadequate UI benefits, it is more useful for the 
analysis of the retirement-income restriction to know how this 
percentage differs among households with different incomes. It 
was noted earlier that the ability to borrow and the likelihood of 
having past savings would tend to ensure that higher-income 
households are more able to maintain consumption during periods 
of unemployment. On the other hand, low-income UI recipient 
households, where weekly earnings are likely to be low, may have 
a greater fraction of their lost earnings replaced by UI than 
higher-income households because of state benefit maxima. The 
net effect is an empirical question, the answer to which is provided 
by methods described in Appendix B. The results of applying these 
methods are presented in table 3.4 for a range of permanent 
incomes that includes over 90 percent of the households in each 
subsample. They show unequivocally that, in both subsamples, 
the probability that a UI recipient household spends its income as 
if benefits are inadequate—in the sense that they are unable to 
maintain consumption—is greatest among low-income house 
holds. (The differences between the two years, and between these 
estimates and the average figures quoted above, which are based 
on equation B.3 in Appendix B, are again the result of sample 
variation—the number of recipient households is relatively small.) 
This suggests that it is the lack of access to borrowed funds or past 
savings that is the major determinant of whether a household can 
maintain consumption during periods of unemployment, given 
that UI benefits replace only part of lost earnings.
One might argue that this finding is not surprising, to say the 
least: low-income households consume less, so it is natural that 
they are more likely to find benefits inadequate. Such an argument 
completely misses the point. Benefit adequacy has been defined in 
terms of the relation between living standards during unemploy 
ment compared to those when household members are at work. 
This says nothing per se about absolute levels of consumption, but 
instead deals with potential shortfalls of consumption among the 
unemployed. What the findings in table 3.4 show is that these 
shortfalls from usual consumption are most likely among
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households whose incomes are lowest even when the members are 
employed.
Table 3.4
Estimated Percent of UI Recipient Households With Inadequate UI
Benefits, at Selected Levels of Permanent Income, 1970 and 1972

























a. Inadequate as defined in the text.
b. 1970 mean permanent income.
c. 1972 mean permanent income.
d. Based on equation B-3 in Appendix B.
Earlier in the discussion, it was deduced that households in 
which persons receive UI benefits will spend those benefits 
disproportionately on luxury items. To examine whether this in 
fact occurs, it is first necessary to know which items are luxuries 
and which are necessities. Table 3.5 shows for each year the 
percentage increase in spending by category in response to a 1 
percent increase in permanent income. (These responses are based 
on the estimated marginal spending propensities out of permanent 
income by all households shown in table 3.3.) 14 "Vacations and 
trips" is the only luxury category, where "luxury" is defined as a 
category for which the percentage increase exceeds one. Food 
appears to be the most basic necessity (lowest percentage) among 
the four categories examined, with housing and transportation 
intermediate between food and vacations. Neither our classifica 
tion nor the relative ranking of spending categories as luxuries or 
necessities seems to conflict with commonly-held notions.
14. These responses (income elasticities) are calculated at the means of each spending 
measure and the measure of permanent income.
Table 3.5
Percentage Change in Spending by Category With One Percent Increase in Permanent Income, and Relative


















































a. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable, 
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Columns (2) and (4) of table 3.5 list values of an index showing 
the relative responsiveness of spending in each category to the 
receipt of additional UI benefits. (The method of computing this 
index is discussed in Appendix B.) A comparison of columns (1) 
and (2), and (3) and (4), provides a striking confirmation of the 
hypothesis on how UI affects consumption among older workers. 
In 1972 the index is greatest for vacations and trips, the category 
that has the highest response of spending to additional permanent 
income. This indicates that UI benefits are spent disproportion 
ately more on this luxury category. The index is below 100 for all 
three other categories; this demonstrates that relatively little of the 
extra UI benefits is allocated to these necessity categories. In the 
1970 subsample, though there are only three categories to 
compare, the same behavior seems to exist: spending out of 
additional UI benefits is greatest on the luxury item, vacations and 
trips. Thus, while the sizes of the responses differ, additional UI 
benefits in both subsamples are spent disproportionately on 
luxuries.
Table 3.1 showed that UI recipient households spend a greater 
fraction of their after-tax incomes on necessities than do other 
households. The earlier predictions are thus completely corrob 
orated: UI recipient households that are forced to cut 
consumption do so by cutting out luxuries; this shows up as a 
reduced share of luxuries in total spending. If given additional UI 
benefits, and thus the chance to restore part of their reduced 
consumption, the analysis presented in table 3.5 indicates that they 
spend most of the higher UI benefits on the luxury items that were 
cut out.
How would a reduction in UI benefits resulting from the 
retirement-income restriction affect the pattern of spending on 
commodities? It should be noted first that, because the restriction 
would bear most heavily upon higher-income households (see 
chapter 2), and because higher-income households usually find 
benefits adequate and are not likely to suffer reduced 
consumption (see above), the effects of the restriction are likely to 
be quite small. To the extent they arise, though, the implication is 
that spending on luxuries would bear the brunt of any reduction in
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spending: it has been shown empirically that UI recipient 
households that must cut spending do so (rationally) by reducing 
spending on luxuries.
Conclusions and Inferences
Having examined in chapter 2 what a retirement-income 
restriction would do to the distribution of income in the older 
population, it was intended in this chapter to examine whether the 
restriction would impose hardship, in the form of sharp reductions 
in consumption. In order to do this, it was necessary to measure 
the fraction of older households for whom unemployment now 
represents a hardship, in the sense that the household is forced to 
reduce consumption because UI benefits, along with savings or 
borrowed funds, are inadequate to maintain spending. Whether 
such reductions are more likely to be observed among higher- or 
lower-income households was also examined. Finally, the data 
were analyzed to see whether those households that are forced to 
reduce consumption cut their spending on luxuries or on 
necessities; clearly, if necessities were cut out one would have to 
view the inadequacy of benefits, and the reduction in UI benefits 
that would result from the retirement-income restriction, as more 
serious.
Using subsamples of UI recipient and other households from 
the Retirement History Survey for 1970 and 1972, spending 
propensities out of UI benefits were examined and compared to 
spending out of other forms of income. While the results differ 
between the two subsamples, this comparison allowed the 
inference that, at most, half of the households in which UI is 
received find benefits inadequate. For at least half, it can be 
inferred from their spending behavior that savings, borrowed 
funds, UI benefits, or some combination of the three are sufficient 
to prevent reductions in consumption. From the estimates it can be 
concluded that those older households that must reduce 
consumption—for which benefits are inadequate as the term was 
defined—are more likely to be households in which income is low 
even when all labor force participants in the household are
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employed. Finally, and perhaps somewhat consolingly, those 
households that are forced to reduce consumption during periods 
of unemployment appear to do so chiefly by reducing spending on 
the luxuries they had been consuming. Obversely, if given 
additional UI benefits, they would restore their total consumption 
by increasing spending particularly on the luxuries they had cut 
out.
Although maintaining consumption is an important goal of UI, 
it is only one of the things the program is aimed at. Conclusions 
about the desirability of the retirement-income restriction cannot 
be drawn solely on the basis of findings in this chapter, as they 
relate to only one of the program's goals. Nonetheless, the 
findings do provide some suggestions that should be considered 
when conclusions for policy are drawn (chapter 5). (1) That the 
majority of households finds benefits to be adequate implies that 
one should not be extremely concerned that the restriction will 
impose still greater burdens on most older households. (2) Even 
among those households that must reduce consumption when 
unemployed, the reduction is mainly in their spending on goods 
one would classify as luxuries. Thus the restriction, and the 
implied reduction in UI benefit payments it entails, will not 
seriously affect spending on necessities by those households which 
will be forced to cut consumption. (3) Unfortunately, the greater 
likelihood of reductions in consumption among low-income 
households that occur when a household member is unemployed 
means that, to the extent that the restriction reduces benefits 
accruing to low-income households, its effects will be more severe. 
Even though UI was not originally intended as a program aimed at 
equalizing incomes, it has accreted some features (benefit maxima 
and, in some states, higher replacement rates for earnings losses of 
low-wage workers) that in fact make it do this to some extent. 
Given this de facto goal, one should be concerned in drawing 
policy conclusions that potential detrimental effects on low- 







The issue in this chapter is how UI affects the labor market 
behavior of older people. The numerous studies of its effects on 
the supply side of the labor market (see Hamermesh 1977) have 
pointed out how it might in general: (1) Increase the duration of 
spells of unemployment; (2) Induce more frequent spells of 
unemployment; and (3) Induce workers loosely attached to the 
labor force to spend more time in the labor force, both time 
employed and time unemployed. In the population of workers 55 
and over, a fourth effect of UI—a changed probability of 
permanent labor force withdrawal—becomes a relevant possibil 
ity. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze this possibility using 
the data from the Retirement History Survey.
As the title of the chapter indicates, there are four possible ways 
that the payment of UI benefits to older persons might be related 
to their probability of retirement. First, the receipt of UI payments 
might induce a postponement of retirement that increases 
production of goods and services in the economy. By providing 
older, unemployed workers with a payment whose continued 
receipt is contingent upon continued labor force attachment, the 
UI program might maintain their attachment even after they 
exhaust UI benefits. This incentive effect might work by giving the 
older UI recipient the means of financing productive job search 
that might otherwise not have been undertaken. (However, as 
shown in the previous chapter, by inference the majority of older 
recipients appear to have funds for this purpose.) Second, UI may 
provide a disincentive effect. Older UI recipients who might
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otherwise have remained in the labor force after they finish 
receiving benefits might find the leisure-time activities engaged in 
while receiving benefits to be more enjoyable than anticipated. 
This discovery may induce them to refuse subsequent job offers 
that they might otherwise have accepted.
UI benefits may induce no change in the behavior of older 
recipients. Instead, they may merely increase the income of part of 
the older population without changing the amount of time the UI 
recipient spends employed. This is especially likely where UI 
benefits are paid with little monitoring of job search activities of 
recipients. In this third case, UI is a windfall for those older 
workers who receive it; there is no effect on the recipient's labor 
market behavior, nor does the individual's unemployment 
experience lead him to change his retirement plans. Fourth, the 
person who received UI may become discouraged about his job 
prospects and retire. Like the windfall effect, this too implies that 
UI is not being used to finance job search that will pay off, and 
unlike the disincentive effect, the receipt of UI benefits induces no 
change in retirement behavior. Rather, and unlike the windfall 
effect, the experience of unemployment causes the worker to 
revise his plans and retire rather than continue looking for work.
The next section analyzes these effects in more detail and 
considers how they may be distinguished from one another 
empirically. Subsamples are then formed from the Retirement 
History Survey, their characteristics are discussed, and use of the 
data to estimate the impact of UI benefits on retirement behavior 
among older recipients is described. The estimates of the effect of 
the amount of benefits received on the probability that an older 
worker is not in the labor force, or states he is retired, are then 
considered and discussed, and the implications for the 
retirement-income restriction are considered in the concluding 
section.
UI and Retirement 59
Issues in Estimating the Relation 
of UI to Retirement Status
The potential incentive and disincentive effects of UI benefits 
upon the older worker's decision to retire flow from the same 
arguments made elsewhere (Hamermesh 1977) about the effects of 
UI on recipients' unemployment duration. These are: (1) The 
incentive effect—an induced reduction in the length of spells of 
unemployment—that would arise if UI benefits enable recipients 
to search for work more efficiently and if that search results in 
their finding jobs more quickly than they otherwise would; and 
(2) The disincentive effect—an induced increase in the length of 
spells of unemployment—that would occur if the benefits reduce 
the recipient's desire to return to work. Both of these effects may 
be operating, though the abundant empirical research suggests the 
disincentive effect is greater for most recipients. On net, UI 
benefits increase the duration of spells of unemployment. l
These two alternative effects would be relatively unimportant 
for older workers if they acted only during the particular spell of 
unemployment that is compensated by UI benefits. They need not 
be small, though, for the older worker if the inducement they 
provide is coupled with stickiness of workers' decisions about 
whether to participate in the labor force. It is known, for example, 
that those in the labor force are very likely to stay in, and that 
those who leave the labor force are likely to stay out. Any 
incentive provided by UI that makes the job search more effective 
will thus induce long-lasting effects in postponing retirement. 
Conversely, any disincentive it gives that lengthens unemployment 
spells or makes job-finding slower can induce long term increases 
in the probability of being retired. The potential effects, coupled 
with stickiness in labor force behavior, may be rather substantial. 2
1. Hamermesh (1977) shows that the strong consensus of past work is that UI induces a net 
increase in the duration of unemployment, though there is less agreement about its 
magnitude.
2. While this notion is probably unimportant for prime-age males, it has been 
demonstrated by Heckman (1977) to be important as a description of the dynamics of labor 
supply among married women. Heckman and Willis (1977) also show that such stickiness 
exists for married women, and, we may infer, for other groups in which the average 
participation rate is not very high.
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The incentive effect is a positive, causative relation between the 
amount of UI benefits (or UI recipient status) and the older 
recipient's subsequent decision to remain in the labor force. The 
disincentive is a negative, causative relation between these same 
observable phenomena. Both imply that UI induces a change in 
behavior from what would have occurred had the benefits not 
been received. Insofar as the older UI recipient also receives 
retirement income, the proposed retirement-income restriction 
would induce changes in retirement patterns if it became effective: 
it would increase retirement rates if UI currently provides older 
workers an incentive to stay in the labor force, and would decrease 
them if the major effect is now a disincentive to remain in the 
labor force.
The third possibility is that UI induces no change in retirement 
behavior, but that it functions as a windfall accruing to workers 
who have already decided to retire. There is good reason for an 
older person who wishes to retire to seek to use UI benefits in this 
manner. First, most older workers did not expect the rates of price 
increase that have occurred in the past fifteen years and are very 
interested in taking any extra transfer income they can to increase 
consumption toward what it would have been had they been able 
to anticipate inflation better. Second, the Social Security system 
offers some slight inducements to postpone the initial receipt of 
benefits. The primary insurance amount is reduced somewhat if 
one begins receiving benefits between ages 62 and 64, and is 
increased very slightly if benefits are delayed beyond age 65. 3 
Thus, if the receipt of UI enables the worker to postpone receiving 
Social Security benefits, it will increase his per-period, though 
probably not his lifetime, amount of such benefits received. 4
3. In 1973, a person who began drawing Social Security benefits at age 62 received on 
average 80 percent of the monthly payment he would have received at age 65. Conversely, if 
he waited until age 68 to claim benefits, his monthly benefit would be 3 percent higher than 
what it would have been had he retired at age 65. (Social Security Administration, Social 
Security Handbook, 1973.)
4. Even ignoring discounting, a person who retired in 1973 at age 65 would have to live 
beyond age 77 in order to accumulate as large a lifetime retirement benefit as would accrue 
to someone who retired at age 62. Thus it is unlikely that this effect will be very great, but 
its direction is nonetheless clear.
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The existence of the windfall effect would imply that the receipt 
of UI benefits does not change retirement behavior among older 
UI recipients, and thus that a retirement-income restriction on UI 
benefits also would not. Nonetheless, the windfall effect would 
have substantial implications for the UI program and for a 
restriction. For example, it would mean that some older UI 
recipients draw benefits with no intention of seeking work, but 
instead view the benefits as a supplemental form of retirement 
income. Unless claims officers are clever at enforcing work- 
seeking requirements, the older recipient who wishes to use UI 
benefits to cushion his entry into retirement can succeed in what 
amounts to an illegitimate use of the system. (It is illegitimate 
because the recipient is not really available for work.) These 
considerations would argue in favor of a restriction as a way of 
circumventing the difficulty in discerning who is truly available for 
work.
The windfall effect implies a negative relation between the 
amount of UI benefits (or recipient status) and subsequent 
decisions to remain in the labor force. This relationship is not a 
causative one, but it is in the same direction as that implied by the 
disincentive effect. As such, the disincentive and windfall effects 
will be difficult to distinguish from one another, as both will lead 
us to observe that higher recent UI benefits are associated with 
higher current probability of being retired. One way to make a 
distinction is to use the possible interaction between UI and 
postponed filing for Social Security benefits to make some 
inferences about which effect is the more likely. In particular, 
there can be no interaction before age 62, since workers below age 
62 are ineligible for Social Security. Thus, if UI payments serve to 
postpone receipt of Social Security among those 62 and over, one 
should observe a greater effect of UI on retirement among those 
62 and over than among those younger. It could then be inferred 
that the windfall effect is important. If no differences in the effects 
of UI by age are observed, it may be concluded that there is no 
postponement motive, and thus that the disincentive effect is 
important. (Clearly, if no relationship is observed between UI 
recipient status or benefits received and retirement status, it must
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be inferred that neither the windfall nor the disincentive effect has 
empirical support.)
If a positive relation is found between UI recipient status, or 
total benefits received, and a subsequent greater likelihood of 
being out of the labor force or retired, it may be inferred that the 
disincentive or windfall effect is important. A skeptic would 
argue, though, that this merely shows that the older unemployed 
worker is out of the labor force because of the unavailability of 
jobs rather than because he has chosen to retire. This 
discouragement relation between receipt of UI benefits and 
subsequent labor force status may exist. One way of controlling 
for the problem is to hold constant the individual's labor force 
status in the year prior to the receipt of UI benefits. This would 
account for any inherent differences in attitudes toward work that 
may affect individuals' labor force attachment.
A second approach followed here is to consider the kinds of 
workers whose retirement behavior is more likely to be affected by 
the receipt of UI benefits (if there is a disincentive effect), or who 
are more likely to retire in the expectation of receiving a windfall 
in the form of UI benefits as they start their retirement. If 
something more than the lack of available jobs is producing the 
relation between UI benefits and subsequent retirement status, it 
should be most important for workers whose prior attachment 
was to firms that were not effectively experience rated. In such 
firms, it costs the employer nothing in UI taxes to lay the older 
worker off and have him receive UI benefits as he moves into 
retirement. Indeed, the employer benefits as other workers, seeing 
such a "golden handshake" being offered, become more willing to 
work for him. In firms that are effectively experience rated, this 
behavior will not occur frequently, as it costs the employer 
something to do it. If a relation between UI benefits and 
subsequent retirement is found, it can thus be determined whether 
it is caused by the disincentive or windfall effects, or by the lack of 
job availability, by examining how the relation differs depending 
upon the worker's prior industry attachment.
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Data Used and Other Factors Affecting 
the Impact of UI on Subsequent Retirement
As is done throughout this monograph, here too subsamples are 
formed from the Retirement History Survey to test the 
hypotheses. Because the ideas are explicitly based on comparing 
receipt of UI at one point to retirement status later, and to hold 
constant for earlier labor force attachment, the longitudinal 
nature of the RHS is invaluable. However, unlike the analyses in 
chapters 2 and 3 which focused properly on household behavior, 
the individual is the appropriate object of attention in studying 
retirement, since it is the individual who retires or works. (As will 
be seen, though, his decision may be affected by circumstances in 
the household.)
Because a substantial body of research has shown that 
retirement behavior of married men differs fundamentally from 
that of single men and women, the analysis concentrates on the 
former group only. 5 This narrows somewhat the applicability of 
the findings, but the price is worth paying to ensure that the results 
are not rendered meaningless because they do not appropriately 
embody the behavior of any single group in testing the hypotheses. 
The sample is also confined to white married men, as some recent 
evidence suggests an extraordinary fraction of older nonwhite 
males retires on disability payments, and thus that their behavior 
too differs fundamentally from that of white married males. 6
Subsamples are formed from the 1971 and 1973 waves of the 
RHS. The sample restrictions result in 1,664 married men ages 
60-64 in 1971, and 2,060 married white men ages 62-67 in 1973. 7
5. Irelan et al. (1976) present evidence from the Retirement History Survey that shows how 
greatly retirement behavior differs among married men, single men, and single women. 
Clark, Kreps, and Spengler (1978) document the determinants of retirement and their 
different effects among various demographic groups.
6. See Siskind (1975) for evidence on the impact of disability payments on participation 
rates of older nonwhite males.
7. Workers age 65 in the 1971 RHS are excluded from the subsample for that year so that 
our results can reflect behavior that is based exclusively on persons not yet eligible for full 
OASI benefits.
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Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of each group by age. Of the 1971 
subsample, 115 drew Ul in 1970; 98 of the 1973 group drew Ul in 
1972. Clearly, the number of Ul recipients in the subsamples is 
small. Whether this is a drawback can be judged by whether or not 
the number is large enough to produce a significant relation 
between the amount of Ul benefits received, or recipient status, 
and subsequent probabilities of being employed or being retired.
As in the two previous chapters, one might question whether the 
subsamples of white married males are representative of the entire 
RHS, and thus of such men in the entire older population in the 
United States. No claims are made that the subsamples represent 
unmarried men, nonwhites or women, so that the results can only 
be applied to gauging the impact of policy on white married men. 
However, some comparisons suggest strongly that the subsamples 
are quite representative. For example, 39.9 percent of the 1971 
subsample had 12 or more years of schooling compared to 37.9 
percent for all men in the 1971 RHS; 16.7 percent had at least 
some college, as compared to 16.5 percent in the RHS (see Irelan 
et al. 1976). These figures are very close, and the differences are 
consistent with the exclusion of blacks and unmarried men. 
Similarly, 30.4 percent of the men in the 1971 subsample reported 
in 1969 that their health interfered with their work, compared to 
35.0 in the RHS. This too is a fairly close correspondence, with the 
differences again likely caused by the exclusion of blacks and 
unmarried men (see footnote 6).
As another set of checks on the representativeness of the 
sample, consider the sample statistics shown in table 4.1 on the 
percent of individuals in the labor force. This decreases with age, 
as one should expect. Moreover, except for workers 65-67 in 1973, 
it is close to that reported for white males in the 1970 Census; 
white married males ages 60-64 had a labor force participation rate 
of 77.4 percent in the 1970 Census, somewhat above the sample 
average of 71.5 percent for 1971 shown in table 4.1. Moreover, the 
lower percentage in the labor force among those 62-64 in 1973 
than in 1971 is consistent with the size of the observed decline in 
participation of older workers in the labor force generally during 
this period. The only serious inconsistency with published data is
Table 4.1
Labor Force Participation, Retirement Status, and UI Experience of White Married Males, 1971 and 1973'











































































































a. Standard deviations of the means are in parentheses.
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that in the 1970 Census the labor force participation rate of white 
married males 65-69 was 41.7 percent, far above that in the 1973 
subsample for those 65-67, the younger group in this five-year age 
range. 8
The measure of labor force status presented in table 4.1 is based 
on questions like those used in the Current Population Survey. It 
forms one of the foci of our discussion of the effects of prior 
receipt of UI benefits. However, the person's subjective report on 
his retirement status may be an equally interesting measure of 
whether he is really seeking work. Accordingly, the same measure 
is used as in chapter 3, namely, the individual's self-reported 
retirement status. The possible responses are that the person is 
fully retired, partly retired, or not retired. From these, measures 
are formed of: (1) Whether the person is fully retired or not; and 
(2) Whether he is partly retired or not. (Since they are based on 
different questions, they do not necessarily add to 100 percent 
with the percentage in the labor force.) As the sample statistics in 
table 4.1 show, the probability that a person is partly or fully 
retired rises with age, as one would expect. Examining whether 
higher values of these two measures are associated with prior 
receipt of UI benefits will provide part of the test for the presence 
of the incentive, disincentive, windfall, or discouragement effects.
The data on UI benefits received cover the entire calendar year 
prior to the survey date. However, the test of the hypotheses 
depends on obtaining measures of UI benefits received during 
spells of unemployment completed prior to the time at which the 
data on labor force or retirement status are obtained. Because the 
interviews on which the RHS is based were conducted in 
April-June biennially, it is certain, given durations of spells of 
unemployment, that UI income in the previous year was for a spell 
of unemployment that for almost all recipients was completed by
8. White males 55-64 decreased their labor force participation from 83.3 percent of the 
population to 79.0 percent between 1970 and 1973. The comparable figures for white males 
65 + are 26.7 percent and 22.8 percent. (See Employment and Training Report of the 
President, 1978.)
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the time of the interview in the following year. 9 Thus for nearly all 
the UI recipients in the subsamples, there is information on UI 
benefits received in a spell of unemployment completed prior to 
the date the information on their employment or retirement status 
was obtained. The average amounts of UI benefits received are 
shown in table 4.1. As in tables 2.1 and 3.1, the table shows that 
the average increases as the respondents in the RHS age. As 
before, it can be noted that the small increase between 1970 and 
1972 in the average weekly benefits paid under the UI program 
(see chapter 2) suggests that the average time during which UI 
benefits are received rises sharply as the sample ages. The relation 
between the amount of compensation received and later labor 
force status is, of course, the focus of this chapter's inquiry.
In order to make this inquiry, the analysis relates the probability 
that a person is in the labor force, and the probabilities that he 
responds he is fully retired or partly retired, to other factors. (See 
Appendix C for the equations reflecting these relationships.) It 
then examines how these probabilities, ranging between zero and 
one, are affected by UI recipient status in the previous year, and 
whether those with longer compensated spells of unemployment, 
and thus greater total UI benefits received, behave differently 
from those who had short spells (received small amounts of 
benefits). (This implicitly assumes that total benefits received are a 
proxy for the duration of compensated unemployment.) In order 
to isolate these effects, though, it is necessary to hold constant for
9. Since only three small states in 1970 had a potential duration in excess of thirty weeks, 
nearly everyone who received UI benefits for a spell of unemployment beginning before 
October 1 would have completed that spell by April of 1971. Assuming a uniform 
distribution of the starting dates of spells, that means surely three-fourths of spells in the 
sample that were compensated in 1970 had to be complete by the time the interview 
questions about labor force status were asked. For the one-fourth of spells that began in the 
last quarter of 1970, and thus whose average starting date was November IS, 1970, the 
average UI benefits received in the subsample implies an average duration of 12 weeks, 
assuming conservatively that the weekly benefit was $60. Only for a small fraction of the 
group, those whose spells exceeded 18 weeks duration, could the spell not have been 
complete by the interview date. We may conclude that, in the 1971 subsample, much less 
than one-fourth of one-fourth—six percent—may still have been receiving UI on the 
interview date for a spell that began in 1970. For the 1973 subsample the figure is likely to 
be only slightly higher.
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other factors that affect the probability of retirement. Fortunately 
the choice of these factors is simplified by the substantial body of 
available research on the determinants of retirement. The evidence 
suggests:
(1) Older workers are more likely to be retired, though whether 
this is because of the natural effects of aging or because of induced 
economic effects is unclear (see Boskin 1977 and Quinn 1977). 
Accordingly, the examination of the effects of UI benefits on 
subsequent retirement or employment status holds constant for 
the individual's age.
(2) Because of the confusion over the causes of the relation 
between age and retirement status, many researchers have tried to 
abstract from health problems that may induce early retirement. 
(See Parsons 1977; Grossman and Benham 1974; and Scheffler 
and Iden 1974.) All have used the individual's own statement 
about his health status. This approach is followed, using the 
person's response to a question about whether his health limits his 
ability to work. However, in order to avoid building an artificial 
relation between retirement status and health status, the person's 
health status as reported two years before he reported his 
employment or retirement status is used.
(3) Labor force participation increases, or the probability of 
retirement decreases, as the amount of education a person has 
attained is greater (Bowen and Finegan 1969; Scheffler and Iden 
1974). This well-known relationship is accounted for by 
controlling for whether the person graduated from high school or 
completed some college, or whether he completed college or 
beyond.
(4) Studies have shown that a husband is more likely to retire if 
his wife is not healthy, or if his wife is not attached to the labor 
force (Boskin 1977; Parsons 1977). This is accounted for, along 
with the biases it might induce in the estimates of the relation 
between UI and subsequent retirement status, by controlling for 
the wife's labor force status as a determinant of the probability 
that the husband is retired.
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(5) Several studies have found that individuals with greater 
income from assets are more likely to retire early (Barfield and 
Morgan 1969; Boskin 1977; and Quinn 1977). Others have shown 
that higher wages are associated with a lower probability of 
retirement, while still other researchers find no effect of wage rates 
on retirement status. To account for all these findings, and to 
control for any spurious relation between UI benefits and 
retirement status that might be induced if this effect were ignored, 
the income in the man's household two years prior to the survey 
date is held constant.
(6) As noted in the previous section, many factors that cannot 
be measured may affect retirement, particularly individual 
differences in the desire to work. To account for these, the 
analysis controls for the man's employment status two years 
before the survey date (when the effect of UI benefits on the 
probability of being in the labor force later is estimated), and for 
his prior retirement status (when the effect of benefits on the 
subsequent probability of his stating he is fully retired, partly 
retired, or not retired at all is examined).
Estimates of the Effect of UI Benefits on the Labor Force 
and Retirement Status of White Married Males
Table 4.2 presents estimates for the 1971 subsample of the 
effects of each of the factors discussed above on the probability 
that a white married male is in the labor force, or that he is fully or 
partly retired based on his own statement. The effects are given in 
percentage points; each coefficient shows the effect, in percentage 
point terms, of a one-unit increase in the factor. For example, in 
column (1) the change of -28.1 shows that each additional $1,000 
of UI benefits received in 1970 is associated with a decrease of 28.1 
percentage points in the probability that the average person in the 
subsample was in the labor force in 1971. Similarly, the change of 
4.5 percentage points in that column implies that men whose 
spouses worked in 1971 had a probability of being in the labor 
force that was 4.5 percentage points above that of men whose 
wives did not work. The asterisk next to a particular change
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Table 4.2
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 60-64 in 1971, N = 1,664
Percentage point change in the 
probability of being: a
Factor
Received UI 1970
UI dollars 1970 (in thousands)











































































a. t-statistics, ratios of the estimated effects on probabilities to their standard errors, are
shown in parentheses.
*The effect on the probability is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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denotes that there is a statistically significant relation between the 
particular factor and labor force (or retirement) status. In 
particular, when the number in parentheses exceeds 1.28, we can 
be 90 percent sure that the effect exists.
Before discussing the results on the effects of UI in the 1971 
subsample (table 4.2), and the 1973 subsample (table 4.3), it is 
worth noting whether the effects of the other factors are the same 
as has been noted in previous research. (If not, it would suggest 
very little credence should be attached to any inferences drawn 
here about the effects of UI.) As a consideration of the effects in 
both tables shows, nearly all of these measures have significant 
effects on the probability of being in the labor force, of being fully 
retired, and of being partly retired. As do previous studies, these 
findings indicate that: (1) Older persons are more likely to be 
retired or out of the labor force; (2) Having a working spouse 
increases the older married man's labor force attachment; 
(3) Having a long term health problem reduces labor force 
attachment; (4) Higher family income also reduces labor force 
attachment and increases the probability the man views himself as 
fully retired, though the effect is small and, for men 60-64 in 1971, 
not statistically significant; and (5) The more educated the man is, 
the more likely he is to be in the labor force, and the less the 
likelihood that he views himself as fully or partly retired. Every 
one of these findings accords with previous work, suggesting any 
inferences drawn about the effects of UI on retirement are based 
on an analysis that produces estimates consistent with earlier 
research on other determinants of retirement.
It is interesting to note that, with the exception of the health 
measure, each factor had a greater effect on the likelihood a 
person is in the labor force, or fully retired, in the 1973 subsample 
than in the 1971 subsample. Each factor becomes more important 
as workers age. This finding is strengthened by a consideration of 
Appendix tables C.1-C.4, in which the same probabilities are 
estimated for the 1971 and 1973 subsamples classified by age 
subgroups. The greatest effects are for workers ages 65-67, the 
smallest for workers 60-61. It is not just that older workers are 
more likely to be retired; rather, any factor that induces retirement 
has a stronger effect the older the worker is.
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Table 4.3
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 62-67 in 1973, N = 2060
Percentage point change in the 
probability of being: 8
Factor
Received UI 1972
UI dollars 1972 (in thousands)











































































a. t-statistics, ratios of the estimated effects on probabilities to their standard errors, are
shown in parentheses.
*The effect on the probability is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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The major focus of this chapter is on the effect of UI benefits on 
the probability of being in the labor force, or being retired, among 
older married white men. Those with short spells of unemploy 
ment (who received UI but only a tiny amount of benefits) have a 
slightly higher probability than nonrecipients of being in the labor 
force in each subsample. (This is shown by the positive effect of 
"received UI" in the tables.) In the 1971 and 1973 subsamples, 
those who receive large amounts of UI benefits are more likely to 
be out of the labor force than nonrecipients. 10 The most important 
issue, of course, is how UI benefits affect the average older 
recipient's retirement behavior. As derived in Appendix C from 
the estimates in table 4.2, in the 1971 subsample the average UI 
recipient is 16.7 percentage points less likely to be in the labor 
force than the average nonrecipient. In the 1973 subsample the 
average UI recipient is 13.0 percentage points less likely to be in 
the labor force than the average nonrecipient. There is virtually no 
doubt that the average older male UI recipient is less likely to be in 
the labor force later on than his counterpart who did not receive 
UI. The evidence strongly refutes the hypothesis that, on net, UI 
produces an incentive effect that raises subsequent labor force 
participation. It is, though, consistent with both a causative 
disincentive effect, and the correlation that is implied by the 
windfall hypothesis and the discouragement effect. Which of these 
possibilities is correct is the subject of the next section of this 
chapter.
Before trying to distinguish empirically among the three 
explanations, one should consider the effects of UI on the person's 
subjective appraisal of his retirement status. In the 1971 
subsample, the average UI recipient is 1.6 percentage points more 
likely to view himself as fully retired, and 6.6 percentage points 
more likely to view himself as partly retired than is the average 
nonrecipient. In the 1973 subsample, the comparable figures are 
3.9 and 8.9 percentage points. (Again, see Appendix C.) It may be
10. For example, in the 1971 subsample a person who received $100 in benefits in 1970 was 
.7 percentage points (3.5 - 28.1 x .1) more likely to be in the labor force in 1971 than 
someone who received no benefits. A person who received $1,500 in benefits was 38.7 
percentage points (3.5 - 28.1 x 1.5) less likely to be in the labor force in 1971.
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concluded that UI benefits are not only associated with subsequent 
lower labor force participation, but they are also related to 
persons viewing themselves as fully, and especially as partly, 
retired.
Disincentives, Windfalls, or Discouragement
In an earlier section, two tests were proposed to distinguish 
whether receipt of UI produces a disincentive effect or a windfall 
effect, or whether discouragement explains the greater tendency of 
prior UI recipients to be out of the labor force. All effects were 
consistent with a negative relationship between UI benefits and 
subsequent labor force status, and such a relationship was 
observed. Since the implications of the three effects for the labor 
market impact of the retirement-income restriction differ 
substantially, it is essential to perform any tests that might 
discriminate which effect is actually operating. The first test 
discriminates between the windfall and disincentive effects. It 
involves examining how the effect of UI on later labor force status 
differs by age group. The argument was that the windfall effect is 
consistent with a greater impact of UI benefits on subsequent 
labor force behavior for workers 62 and over than for those below 
age 62, because UI might provide for the older worker household's 
needs early in retirement and thereby allow the older worker to 
postpone filing for OASI benefits and thus obtain a larger 
monthly benefit later on, as implied in the epigraph.
Table 4.4 presents estimates of the differences between UI 
recipients and nonrecipients in their average labor force 
participation rates during the survey periods. These are presented 
for the 1971 and 1973 subsamples of white married males ages: 
(1) 60-61 in 1971; (2) 62-64 in 1971; (3) 62-64 in 1973; and 
(4) 65-67 in 1973. The differences are based on estimates presented 
in Appendix C, tables C.5 and C.6, and they are adjusted to reflect 
differences between UI recipients and nonrecipients along all the 
factors—spouse's work status, education, household income, 
etc.—that have been held constant in order to isolate the effect of 
UI benefits on subsequent participation in the labor force. Also
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shown for comparison purposes are the average labor force 
participation rates for all men in each subsample, and for each age 
subgroup.
Table 4.4
Adjusted Differences in Labor Force Participation Rates Between UI 
Recipients and Nonrecipients Among Older Married White Males, by 
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Let us compare the adjusted differences by age subgroup. 
Among workers 60-61 in 1971, the average participation rate for 
all UI recipients was 25.4 percentage points less than that for 
nonrecipients. Among those 62-64, the average rate for recipients 
was 20.4 percentage points less in 1971, and 32.7 percentage points 
less in 1973. Finally, among those 65-67 in 1973, the average 
person who received UI in 1972 was 23.1 percentage points less 
likely to be in the labor force in 1973 than the average nonrecipient 
in that age group.
On a relative basis, let us compare the differences in 
participation rates to the average participation rate in the 
subgroup. These calculations clearly show that there is a stronger 
effect after age 61; for example, the effect is -25.4 percentage 
points on an average rate of 82.2 percent for those 60-61; for 
people 65-67 the effect is -23.1 percentage points on an average
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participation rate of 27.3. Even on an absolute basis, though, the 
same conclusion may be drawn by comparing the estimated 
reductions in participation for the cohort of persons age 60-61 in 
1971 and 62-64 in 1973.
The evidence is fairly clear that UI benefits reduce subsequent 
labor force participation more among those 62 and older than 
among those 60-61. This supports the conclusion that the windfall 
effect is a better explanation of the observed negative relation 
between UI benefits and later labor force participation among 
older married white men than is the disincentive hypothesis.
The second test was designed to distinguish between the windfall 
effect and the discouragement hypothesis—the possibility that the 
negative relation between UI benefits and later labor force 
participation reflects discouragement about the availability of 
jobs. Part of any impact of discouragement in the estimates is 
removed when holding constant for earlier labor force 
participation. Many persons who would be discouraged by 
unemployment have only a tenuous attachment to the labor force, 
and adjustment for that has been made. The finding that UI 
benefits are negatively related both to subsequent participation 
and subsequent subjective views on one's retirement status also 
strengthens the conclusion that the discouragement effect is not 
important. A man who is discouraged may well drop out of the 
labor force, but would perhaps be less likely to view himself as 
retired. Nonetheless, a formal test can aid in providing further 
discrimination between the windfall and discouragement possibil 
ities.
As noted earlier, the windfall effect will be greatest when 
experience rating of UI taxes is ineffective for the recipient's 
former employer (when increases in benefits charged to the 
employer cannot raise the firm's UI tax rate since it is already at 
the maximum rate). Becker (1972) has shown that long term 
cost/tax ratios are far above 1.0 in mining, construction, and 
manufacturing in the states he surveyed. The average firm in these 
industries is thus more likely than the average firm in other 
industries to be ineffectively experience rated, and thus more likely
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to be willing to lay off older workers seeking to receive UI benefits 
as they move toward retirement. Ideally, one would like to use 
data on the actual UI tax rate of the firm in which each person in 
the sample was employed. Because such information is not 
available, it is necessary to distinguish among UI recipients by 
their previous industry of attachment to reflect possible 
differences in the effectiveness of the experience rating of their 
employers' taxes. This deficiency clearly biases the tests against 
finding any relation between the degree of experience rating of the 
UI taxes on one's former employer and one's subsequent labor 
force participation, and thus against the windfall hypothesis. 
Thus, if any small difference is found between subsequent 
retirement behavior by UI recipients last employed in mining, 
manufacturing, and construction, as compared to other recipients, 
it may be inferred that the true differences are larger and that there 
is evidence against the discouragement, and for the windfall, 
hypothesis.
The test is performed by reestimating the effects of the various 
factors discussed on the probability of labor force participation of 
the men in the 1971 and 1973 RHS subsamples. This is done in 
such a way as to allow inferences of: (1) Whether the men whose 
current or most recent job attachment was in mining, 
manufacturing, or construction (MMC) have different subsequent 
labor force participation rates from other workers; (2) Whether 
UI recipients from MMC have a different rate of subsequent 
participation compared with recipients in other industries; and 
(3) Whether the impact on subsequent participation of longer 
duration of benefits (proxied by total amount of benefits received) 
differs for recipients from MMC compared with those in other 
industries. (The method for accomplishing this reestimation is 
shown in Appendix C.) To ensure that the focus is only on those 
likely to be eligible for UI in 1972 (or 1970), those who were not 
employed in 1971 (1969) were deleted from the samples. This left 
1,360 people in the 1973 subsample, and 1,372 in the 1971 
subsample.
The relative effects of the three factors discussed in the previous 
paragraph are shown for the two RHS subsamples in table 4.5.
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(These effects are adjusted for differences in spouse's work status, 
education, etc. among nonrecipients, recipients from MMC, and 
other recipients.) It should be noted that in the 1971 subsample, 
none of the relative effects is significantly different from zero 
(although the implications of the directions of the effects are the 
same as those for 1973 discussed below). In that subsample, at 
least, either the discouragement effect predominated, or the 
weakness of the test (because of the inability to get a good fix on 
the UI tax status of each worker's former employer) prevents a 
discrimination between the windfall and discouragement effects. 
Accordingly, the discussion concentrates on the 1973 results. The 
first figure in the second column shows that the average older 
married white male worker employed in mining, manufacturing, 
or construction in 1972 was 8.3 percentage points less likely to be 
in the labor force in 1973 than his counterpart in other industries. 
The difference is likely due to greater requirements on physical 
strength in these industries and the greater prevalence of 
negotiated or imposed mandatory retirement provisions.
The interesting results are implied by the second and third 
differences in column (2) of table 4.5. The second adjusted 
difference implies that the average UI recipient from MMC differs 
hardly at all in his likelihood of being in the labor force later as 
compared to his counterpart in other industries. However, each 
extra thousand dollars in UI benefits reduces the probability of 
subsequent participation much more for workers laid off from 
MMC than for others. As an example, the differences imply that 
workers who received the average amount of UI benefits were only 
8.7 percentage points less likely to be in the labor force later if they 
had worked in MMC than in other industries. However, a worker 
who received $1,000 more than the average recipient, and who had 
worked in MMC, was 36.4 percentage points less likely to be in the 
labor force later than comparable workers in other industries. 
Assume weekly benefit amounts did not differ among recipients 
from the two groups of industries. Then, the conclusion is that 
long term UI recipients from MMC are more likely to be out of the 
labor force later on than are long term recipients on layoff from 
other industries. This conclusion, and the fact that the average
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recipient's behavior differs very slightly between the two industry 
groups, implies that the short term recipients from MMC are more 
likely than others to remain in the labor force.
Table 4.5
Adjusted Differences in Labor Force Participation Rates of UI 
Recipients and Other Older White Married Males, by Industry of 






Workers in mining, manufacturing or
construction (MMC) compared with -.002 -8.3* 
workers in other industries (-.01) (-3.07)
UI recipients with benefits $1,000 above 
the average from MMC compared with
recipients with benefits $1,000 above the 2>1 ~8 - 7 
average from other industries (-- 16) (-.39)
UI recipients with benefits $1,000 above 
the average from MMC compared with
recipients with benefits $1,000 above the -11.7 -36.4* 
average from other industries_________(-.63)____(-1.04)
a. t-statistics, ratios of the estimated effects on probabilities to their standard errors, are
shown in parentheses.
*The effect on the probability is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
The third difference by itself suggests that among older workers 
formerly employed in these industries where experience rating was 
imperfect, meaning many employers pay the maximum tax rate, 
those workers who receive large amounts of UI benefits (and thus 
presumably have long compensated spells of unemployment) are 
less likely to be in the labor force in the following year than 
similarly long term unemployed workers in other industries. This 
implies that, where it costs the firm little to lay off a worker
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wishing to retire and also collect UI benefits in the process, a 
greater incidence of this effect is found. This is additional evidence 
for the importance of the windfall effect, and at least weak 
evidence against the hypothesis that the negative relation between 
UI benefits and later participation reflects older long term 
beneficiaries becoming discouraged workers.
Conclusions and Implications
This chapter has examined the relationship between UI benefits 
and subsequent retirement status among older married white 
males. A number of reasons have been proposed why the two 
might be related, and a number of tests have been performed 
aimed at discriminating from among these reasons. A substantial 
negative relationship was found between UI benefits and labor 
force participation among older workers. The validity of this 
finding is strengthened by the corroboration the estimates provide 
of past results on the determinants of labor force behavior among 
older males. Further, since the estimates held constant for 
differences in family characteristics, for educational attainment, 
and, most important, for prior labor force attachment, it is 
unlikely that the negative correlation found between receipt of 
substantial UI benefits and lower labor force participation is 
spurious.
The correlation is greater among men ages 62-64 than among 
men 60-61. From this comparison, it may be inferred that UI may 
not be inducing early retirement, but may instead be acting partly 
as a pure windfall to those who have already decided to retire. 
Thus, restricting UI benefits on the basis of retirement income will 
neither hasten nor postpone retirement. Instead, it will reduce 
incomes of persons who would retire anyway.
In a sense, the windfall that UI represents for workers deciding 
to retire is a retirement bonus, but it is one that many firms 
assigned the maximum tax rate can pay at no cost. A weak test has 
indicated that the windfall effect is more important among 
workers in industries where experience rated taxes are more likely 
to be at the maximum. This suggests that the employer whose UI
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taxes are not effectively covering his UI costs in a sense colludes 
with the older worker wishing to receive UI benefits as he begins 
his retirement. This finding, and the fact that the estimates hold 
constant for labor force status two years before the survey date, 
imply that the negative relation between UI benefits and 
subsequent labor force participation does not just reflect 
discouragement among older workers about job prospects.
The behavior suggested by the evidence is understandable: it 
makes good sense for older workers to use UI benefits to cushion 
the path to retirement. It suggests that the retirement-income 
restriction will have no effect on retirement and labor force 
decisions by older workers. Since UI benefits appear in many cases 
to be a windfall to those who have already decided to retire, 
removing the benefits will not change those persons' behavior. 
The restriction is thus one solution to the misuse of benefits, 
though it is a solution that also affects older persons seriously 
interested in searching for work. Obviously, if the work test were 
made more stringent, fewer UI funds would be misused in this 
way. At the same time, older claimants whose spells of 
unemployment are short, and for whom, the results suggest, UI 
induces a slight increase in labor force participation, would face 
little if any reduction in UI benefits, as they appear to make 
substantial efforts to return to work.
On the surface, a stricter work test has an easy appeal as a 
solution to the misuse of UI benefits implied by these findings. It 
would be consistent with preventing part of the older population 
from using administrative difficulties in the program to convert 
this labor market insurance program into a pure transfer to them. 
However, there are problems with this solution, and they are 
discussed in detail in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 5
The Role of Unemployment




These empirical studies of UI and the consumption and labor 
market behavior of older workers and of their income distribution 
have with varying degrees of certainty reached a number of 
conclusions.
(1) Unemployment insurance equalizes the distribution of 
income among older workers compared to what it would be in the 
absence of UI benefit payments. This finding implies that anything 
that increases benefit payments to the average older worker will 
increase income equality within the older population. Further, 
since households headed by older workers are in general less well 
off than the average American household, any policy that 
specifically decreases UI accruing to older workers will decrease 
income equality across demographic groups stratified by age.
(2) The uniform federal restriction that reduces UI payments to 
workers receiving pensions or OASI retirement benefits would, in 
the early 1970s, have reduced those payments by more than 
one-fourth among workers 59-64 years old, and by over 40 percent 
among workers 61-66 years old. Such a restriction, enacted in the 
1976 UI Amendments, P.L. 94-566, will thus substantially reduce 
the total amount of UI benefit payments accruing to older 
Americans. As such, because older Americans are generally less 
well off than others, it will increase the income gap between older 
workers and others.
(3) Within the population of households headed by older 
workers, the federal restriction on the simultaneous receipt of UI
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and retirement income will reduce income inequality. This is 
because a majority of those older workers receiving both types of 
income are in the upper deciles of the distribution of income in the 
older population. The restriction bears most heavily on better-off 
older households. A federal restriction will thus decrease 
inequality of income within an age group over the lifetimes of the 
group's members, but increase it if compared across age groups.
(4) Though the retirement-income restriction will hurt mainly 
better-off older households, the evidence in chapter 3 suggests that 
the ability to maintain consumption during periods of unemploy 
ment is greatest among these households. Indeed, the availability 
of prior liquid savings, or the ability to borrow to maintain living 
standards when unemployed, increases steadily as families with 
lower lifetime incomes are compared to those with higher incomes.
(5) Within the population of older UI recipients it appears that 
about half have access to past savings or to borrowing in sufficient 
amounts so that limits on UI benefits do not cause hardship, in the 
sense of substantial reductions in spending. Nearly a majority of 
older UI recipients are able to smooth consumption to avoid sharp 
reductions in living standards during periods of unemployment.
(6) Those families that do not have savings and cannot borrow 
easily when the head is unemployed cut back disproportionately 
their consumption of luxury goods. Conversely, the UI benefits 
received by them are spent to restore purchases of such goods.
(7) UI benefits do not work to keep recipients in the labor force 
in subsequent years; nor do they provide a disincentive that 
induces workers to leave the labor force. Instead, they appear to 
be extra income for workers that does not affect their decision to 
leave the labor force. Similarly, they seem to be associated with, 
but do not cause, older workers regarding themselves as retired.
(8) The relation between prior receipt of UI benefits and current 
labor force status is much stronger among workers 65-67 than 
among those 62-64, and stronger in the latter group than among 
those 60-61 years old. This finding, and the fact that job 
availability is held constant for each individual, supports the
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inference that UI functions as an income transfer to workers who 
have made the decision to retire.
(9) The negative relation between UI and subsequent labor force 
attachment is strongest for workers with long-duration unemploy 
ment and those who previously worked in industries where the 
experience rating of UI taxes is most likely to be ineffective. The 
former result indicates that short term claimants are not using UI 
as a cushion into retirement, and that the problem is concentrated 
among longer term claimants. The latter result is consistent with 
the observation that this misuse of UI by some older workers may 
be viewed as a form of tacit collusion between the worker and his 
employer. Because the benefits do not raise the employer's UI tax 
liability, he is willing to collude with the worker and in doing so to 
acquire the reputation—one which lowers his future labor 
costs—of being a good employer to work for.
Arguments on What Should Be Done
The arguments for and against allowing pensioners to draw UI 
benefits can be classified as logical—based on the view that federal 
intervention in state UI programs should be minimized; as 
economic efficiency arguments—based on the desire to improve 
public well-being by reducing disincentives to work or to employ 
resources in their most productive uses; and as equity 
arguments—based on a desire to reduce income inequality. Let us 
examine each of these sets of arguments in turn, considering for 
each first those that suggest no retirement-income restriction 
should be placed on the amount of UI payments, and then those 
that imply such restrictions should be imposed.
There are three logical arguments against imposing any 
restrictions:
(1) As it now stands, there are no other federal standards on 
disqualifying income, potential duration, or amount of regular
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state UI benefits. 1 A federal restriction on UI benefits for 
pensioners imposes the first such federal standard and opens the 
door to substantial further federal intrusions.
(2) Individuals who are laid off—and who are thus involuntarily 
out of work—should be able to maintain their incomes and 
consumption regardless of their age and pension status as long as 
they are available and seeking work. (This argument is the major 
one made by Murray 1967, page 37.) Why should those who are 
attached to the labor force and interested in working, but who 
happen to be 60 or over, be discriminated against?
(3) To ensure that claimants, be they pensioners or not, 
maintain an attachment to the labor market, UI claims officials in 
the states are supposed to make sure that claimants are actively 
seeking work. This is true for pensioners as well, and, if the rules 
are applied properly, it ensures that those pensioners drawing 
benefits are not avoiding work.
Each of these arguments can be contradicted by corresponding 
logical objections:
(1) Admittedly, once one imposes a federal standard on UI and 
retirement income one cannot logically argue against further 
federal standards. Yet such logical rigor imposes a discipline 
which would likely make many opponents of a federal restriction 
very uneasy. For example, organized labor does not argue against 
the restriction because it objects to federal intervention: it 
recognizes that it has repeatedly urged Congress to impose federal 
standards, even federally mandated uniformity, on benefit
1. The current absence of federal standards on disqualifying income, benefit amounts, etc. 
is the main argument used in National Commission on Unemployment Compensation, 
Interim Report, November 1978, for letting the pension restriction in P.L. 94-566 lapse. 
(The Commission did, though, recommend that the entire issue of benefit standards be 
considered.) Early in the history of the issue, Senator Humphrey argued, Cong. Record 
87:1, S4196 March 16, 1961, that imposition of a federal standard regarding retirement 
income and UI would be inconsistent with the states' rights views of many of the supporters 
of such a standard.
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structures in regular state UI programs. 2 Similarly, one cannot 
argue against the restriction on a logical basis and then urge 
Congress to enact legislation "equalizing costs" of UI among 
states. 3
(2) To what extent is the layoff of an older worker really 
involuntary on the worker's part? Both economic theory 
(Feldstein 1976) and empirical work (Hutchens 1979) suggest that 
otherwise identical workers in states with more liberal UI benefit 
structures and less experience rating of taxes are more likely to be 
laid off. Chapter 4 demonstrates empirically that there is a greater 
incidence of subsequent retirement among long term UI claimants 
in those industries where experience rating is relatively ineffective. 
This finding is consistent with the observation that, for some older 
workers seeking to retire, a layoff is the result of an implicit 
agreement that makes them and their employer better off. The 
layoff gives some older workers temporary additional income to 
supplement their pensions in the early stages of retirement. For 
their employers, payroll taxes may not increase, and the employer 
may be able to obtain more qualified workers if he can acquire the 
reputation of being a good employer in this sense.
(3) The job search provisions of state UI laws are essential to 
them, yet a massive weight of evidence (summarized in 
Hamermesh 1977) suggests that UI benefits do provide a 
disincentive to return to work. This being the case, one cannot 
claim that local UI offices can in fact distinguish perfectly which 
workers have a serious attachment to the labor market. This may 
not be the fault of the local UI officials: their administrative 
funding has simply not kept pace with the rise in the number of
2. See, for example, the 1975 AFL-CIO Resolution, reported in National Commission for 
Manpower Policy, Proceedings of a Coherence on Labor's Views on Manpower Policy, 
Special Report No. 6,1976. The resolution states that, "The AFL-CIO has long supported 
federalization of the unemployment insurance program ... " and goes on to call for 
minimum standards of two-thirds of the worker's weekly wage.
3. See, for example, cost equalization proposals like those proposed by Congressmen Carr 
and Brodhead, 96th Congress, H.R. 1572 and H.R. 3937.
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insured unemployed. 4 Thus, even if one felt that local UI offices 
could enforce job search requirements in the 1960s, one would be 
less willing to hold that view in light of the relative decline in 
funding of employment security administration since the early 
1970s. The implications of this decline are likely to be especially 
severe for efforts to monitor the activities of older workers. As 
seen in chapter 2, many of them have access to retirement income, 
and numerous studies have shown (see, e.g., Bowen and Finegan 
1969) that such income reduces the labor force attachment of older 
workers. This suggests that the older workers will, if job-seeking 
requirements are not carefully enforced, be much more likely than 
others to have little interest in moving off UI benefits and into 
employment.
One might argue against the retirement-income restriction on 
efficiency grounds: UI may provide older workers with the income 
to finance productive job search that would not be undertaken if 
UI benefits were not provided. Thus the inducement UI provides 
the worker to stay in the labor force is beneficial, for it overcomes 
the disincentives caused by people's inability to borrow to finance 
job search. The counter-argument is based on the findings in 
chapter 4: most older workers do not prolong their attachment to 
the labor force if they receive substantial amounts of UI benefits. 
There is no incentive effect that would help the labor market 
operate more efficiently. There is also no disincentive that implies 
a decrease in labor market efficiency. Rather, since the payment of 
UI benefits to pensioners appears not to affect their behavior, on
4. For example, federal grants for employment security administration in 1967 dollars 
totalled $620 million in 1969, $959 million in 1973, and $1,010 million in 1977. At the same 
time, the number of insured unemployed rose from 1.177 million in 1969, to 1.793 million 
in 1973, to 3.111 million in 1977. (Calculated from Bureau of the Census, Compendium of 
Government Finances, 1964; Idem., State Government Finances, 1969,1973, and 1977; and 
Economic Report of the President, 1979.) Clearly, fewer resources per UI recipient have 
been devoted to the administration of state employment security administration programs. 
This does not prove that monitoring of work-seeking efforts has become less stringent. 
However, we know that most of the political pressure is aimed toward the timely payment 
of claims, and anecdotal evidence from state and federal UI officials suggests that the 
emphasis has indeed shifted toward this. Accordingly, we may reasonably conclude that 
monitoring activities have suffered.
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the benefit side at least, any restriction will neither remove nor 
introduce further disincentives into the labor market. However, as 
the payment of these benefits must be financed by higher taxes, 
which may distort employers' decisions about the kinds and 
number of workers to hire, what is neutral on the benefit side may 
produce a loss of efficiency overall because of its effects on the tax 
side.
Because the evidence provides little support for efficiency 
arguments on either side of the restriction issue, the importance of 
equity arguments is enhanced. Among the justifications for 
allowing pension recipients to receive UI benefits are:
(1) As seen in chapter 1, older households have lower incomes 
than the average household in the United States. Cutting those 
incomes still further by reducing these households' receipts of UI 
benefits will further increase this income gap.
(2) As has been argued in Congress, pension and OASI 
retirement benefits are woefully inadequate. 3 As a matter of equity 
UI benefits are needed to supplement retirement benefits so that 
older workers do not suffer unduly.
Countering these arguments are a number of considerations that 
imply the restriction would have a less detrimental effect on the 
income distribution and on commonly held concepts of fairness.
(1) Though older households are, on average, not so well off as 
others, the restriction on UI benefits will, as seen in chapter 2, 
impinge chiefly upon those households in the upper half of the 
income distribution among older workers. Thus those households 
that will experience the most severe decline in UI benefit income 
will suffer least from the restriction. Moreover, as seen in chapter 
3, their consumption behavior suggests that better-off older 
workers have access to prior savings and borrowed funds. Sharp 
cutbacks in their receipts of UI benefits would not appear to have 
a severe detrimental impact on their living standards.
5. See, for example, the statements of Senators Javits and Nelson, Cong. Record, 94:2, 
S17004 and S17017, September 29, 1976.
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(2) Even though older workers as a group are not so well off as 
others, the income gap results to some extent from their lower 
average educational attainment. One can argue that their lifetime 
incomes do not differ so much from the average in the population 
as their current incomes would suggest, because they began 
earning income early in life and thus earned income for more 
years. Why, so the argument goes, should they then receive 
additional subsidies late in life?
(3) Finally, and perhaps most telling, if pension and other 
retirement benefits were inadequate in the 1960s, they are, as seen 
in chapter 1, surely more adequate today. Pension benefits and, to 
a much larger extent, OASI retirement benefits have increased 
significantly as a fraction of prior earnings since that time, 
resulting in a narrowed income gap between older workers and 
others.
What can one conclude from this welter of arguments pro and 
con on the issue of restricting UI benefits for pensioners? The 
most sensible conclusion is that anyone who believed that such a 
restriction was improper in the 1960s because of inadequate 
pension and OASI benefits should admit that his arguments are 
less applicable now. Anyone who favored a restriction then should 
be even more favorably disposed toward one today on these 
grounds. Good equity grounds have been shown for believing that 
such a restriction will not harm those families most in need. Part 
of the support for this view stems from the findings in chapters 2 
and 3. Part comes, too, from the realization of the tremendous 
improvements in retirement benefits that have occurred in the past 
fifteen years. It has also been demonstrated that older married 
white male UI claimants, with long unemployment spells, 
especially those in industries that are not well experience rated, 
merely use UI benefits to ease their path into retirement. This 
finding, obtained in chapter 4, had not been observed earlier. 
Finally, it appears that, despite the rules requiring active job 
search, it is often administratively impossible with the resources 
available to discriminate from among older workers those who are 
actively seeking work. Given these arguments, many of which 
would not have been valid in the 1960s, the introduction of a
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broader restriction on the simultaneous receipt of UI benefits and 
retirement income does not appear harsh or unreasonable. This is 
especially so if, in recognition of the greater reduction in labor 
force attachment that accompanies increased retirement income, it 
is imposed as a do liar-for-dollar reduction, as in most states and in 
the federal legislation, rather than as an outright disqualification.
Possibilities for Reform
Clearly the ideal solution to the problems outlined in this 
monograph is to avoid the issue by instituting a more 
discriminating enforcement of job-search requirements imposed 
upon older UI claimants. Whether a sufficiently discerning 
enforcement is even possible without too great an imposition on 
the claimant's freedom is doubtful. It is surely impossible, though, 
with the level of funding of employment security administration 
that has existed in the 1970s or appears likely in the future. Thus 
this ideal solution cannot in practice be implemented successfully.
A variant on the ideal solution is that definitions of suitable 
work be relaxed for older workers with retirement income who are 
long-duration claimants, say above 13 weeks in a benefit year, and 
who are not certified by their employer to be on temporary layoff. 
That this is done only for older workers may appear 
discriminatory, but it recognizes the crucial distinction made in the 
previous section: the older worker who receives retirement income 
has less incentive to seek work while receiving UI than do other 
workers. Suitable work requirements were relaxed in the 
legislation extending Federal Supplemental Benefits in 1977, so 
there is some precedent for this (though applying this to regular 
benefits imposes a new federal standard on benefits). 6 However, if 
each state passed such a requirement, it would help ensure that the 
older long-duration claimant would take a job if one were 
available, and it would reduce reliance on the discretion of the
6. Section 104 of P.L. 95-19 defines suitable work as "any work which is within the 
individual's capabilities," and goes on to require that "emergency compensation shall not 
be payable ... if during such week such individual fails to accept any offer of suitable 
work or to apply for any suitable work to which he was referred by the State agency."
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local claims officer. This change is consistent with the observation 
that the seniority most older workers have ensures that, if they are 
not on temporary layoff, they are likely to be people whose jobs 
have disappeared. Thus, requiring them to take a less-skilled job 
that becomes available is not likely to hurt their longer term labor 
market chances, both because their previous jobs are no longer 
there, and because their remaining work life is short. The problem 
with this solution is that it would face vigorous legal challenges on 
the grounds that it constitutes discrimination by age. To make the 
requirement apply beyond the thirteenth week of unemployment 
to claimants of all ages may mean imposing a harsher work 
requirement than is desirable on younger claimants whose skills 
may be eroded in a new, less demanding job that they would be 
forced to take. In short, while a broader definition of suitable 
work appears to be a reasonable answer to the problem of 
discerning which older workers have a serious labor force 
attachment, in fact it too suffers from flaws that are so severe as to 
require a search for other alternatives.
The economic arguments of equity and improved efficiency in 
the functioning of the labor market militate in favor of some 
better method of ensuring that older workers receiving UI 
maintain an attachment to the labor market. Faute de mieux, the 
best way to do that appears to be to recognize that the receipt of 
retirement income is a signal that the person's labor market 
attachment is reduced; the more retirement income, the clearer the 
signal. This recognition, and the realization of the severe practical 
difficulties of applying work tests thoroughly, implies that the best 
solution is that each state should on its own enact a requirement 
that would reduce UI benefits one dollar for each dollar of 
pension or OASI retirement benefits received in the week of 
unemployment claimed. Such a requirement would be a 
compromise between complete disqualification and continuing a 
system which, as has been shown, is used by many older people, 
especially those who are better-off financially, to cushion their 
move into retirement. It would remove the first example of a 
federal benefit standard for regular UI benefits. (The FUTA law 
already has an implicit federal tax standard.) It would embody a
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recognition of recent changes in the levels of support that other 
sources provide for older Americans. It would implicitly 
recognize the difficulties inherent in applying job-search 
requirements that may be too narrow and certainly are often 
neglected by local office staffs that are often fully occupied just 
with taking claims.
The basis for this proposal is a judgment that the gains from a 
uniform federal restriction are outweighed by the cost of 
introducing the first important federal standard on UI benefits. 
However, if federal standards are imposed on other aspects of the 
benefit structure, for example on states' maximum benefits, or if a 
federal "cost equalization" or a "reinsurance" program that 
involves continuing or repeated subsidies to certain states is 
enacted, any objection to the federal restriction on the 
simultaneous receipt of retirement income and UI benefits should 
disappear. At that point, the restriction contained in the 1976 UI 
Amendments, and that became effective in 1980, would be 
justified. Until that time, and despite the gains in terms of equity 
and maintenance of public confidence in the federal-state UI 
system, the political cost of a major federal benefit standard 
appears too great. This would suggest that, unless other federal 
benefit standards become law, the federal standard restricting 
receipt of UI and pensions should be repealed.
This does not mean there is no legitimate role for federal 
legislation that would lessen the problems discussed and 
demonstrated in this study. In particular, it is quite consistent with 
existing federal intervention in regular state UI programs for 
Congress to enact, as part of the experience rating provisions 
under FUTA, a requirement that defines experience rating in such 
a way that tax schedules are broadened and fewer employers are 
ineffectively experience rated. Aside from its beneficial impact on 
many other aspects of the UI program (see Hamermesh 1977), this 
would help reduce the number of employers willing to see their old 
employees receive UI as they move into retirement. As such, it 
would ameliorate the problem by federal action without the 
introduction of federal benefit standards.
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The cost of doing nothing, of continuing in most states to allow 
pensioners to receive full UI benefits, is the hidden one of a 
continued reduction in public confidence in the UI system. Given 
the ease of the remedies at hand—both the imposition through 
state legislation of dollar-for-dollar restrictions on the receipt of 
UI by pensioners, and federally-imposed requirements for 
improved experience rating—these costs need not continue to be 
borne. Nor do new costs, in the form of federal benefit standards 
that would represent a fundamental departure from the past 
history of the federal-state UI program, need to be imposed. The 
problem can be ameliorated within the framework and past 
history of the UI program, and it can be done in a way that is 
consistent with commonly-held notions of fairness and that does 
not impose additional real economic costs on society.
Appendix A
DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME AND UI BENEFITS 
IN THE RETIREMENT HISTORY SURVEY SUBSAMPLES
Table A.I presents Gini ratios and Suits statistics (see Suits, 
1977, for a discussion of these latter). The Gini coefficients listed 
in table A. 1 may appear somewhat high to the reader familiar with 
the literature on income inequality in the United States. In fact, 
they are quite consistent with Taussig's (1973) results on a cross 
section of families in 1967. While the Gini coefficient for his entire 
sample was .417, it was .429 for households headed by individuals 
ages 55-64 and .653 for those headed by individuals ages 65 or 
over.
The Suits statistics in the second row are lower than the values 
reported in Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978), where 
numbers between -.47 and -.50 appear. Nonetheless, our estimates 
do suggest that UI benefits equalize distribution of income. Also, 
as a comparison of the statistics in the second and third rows of 
table A.I shows, the statistics become more negative in the 1970 
and combined samples, indicating more equalization of the 
distribution of incomes across households when the retirement- 
income restriction is simulated. The opposite is the case in the 1972 
sample.
Table A.I
Measures of Inequality of Income and UI Distributions, 1970,1972, and
Combined Subsamples
Measure 1970 1972 Combined
Gini ratio on all other income
Suits statistics on UI 
Actual amount received








EQUATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF CHAPTER 3
For each UI recipient, let Z be the minimum of UI benefits 
received in years t and t-2 (a two-year lag because of the two-year 
hiatus between interviews in this panel of data). Then we define 
transitory UI benefits as Uj = Uj - Z, where Uj are UI benefits in
year t. Permanent income is defined as:
YPt = .5(Yt + Yt_2) + .5(2UJ + 2U{_2) + Z,
where Y is non-UI after-tax income, and YP is our measure of 
permanent income. 1 The first term is an average of income flows 
other than UI in the two years; for nonrecipient households, it is 
the definition of permanent income. The second term is designed 
to reflect the lost income replaced by UI, and it implicitly assumes 
a constant replacement rate of 50 percent. (Without data on state 
of residence, this is the best that can be done.) The third term is 
just that part of UI benefits that can be viewed as permanent, in 
the sense that it is received each year. Transitory income is simply 
YTt = Yt - YPt .
In the equations to be estimated we assume each unconstrained 
UI recipient household (those like the Joneses) consumes the i'th 
spending category according to:
Q = aio + ailYP + ai2 (YT + U<), i = 1, . . . , N, (B-l)
where Cj is consumption of the i'th spending category, N is the 
number of categories, the BJQ are constants, and the ajj and a£ are
marginal spending propensities out of permanent and transitory 
income. Because our cross section data include income observed
1. In order to make the income data for the various years comparable, Yt_2 and Ut-2 were 
blown up by the change in average income in the sample between years t-2 and t. Between 
1968 and 1970 this was 6.57 percent, and between 1970 and 1972 it was 7.39 percent.
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only biennially, part of any measure of "transitory income" may 
contain permanent components. 2 To capture this possibility we 
include transitory income even for the unconstrained UI recipient 
household, but we expect aji>aj2 . A household that does not
receive UI will consume according to (B-l), except that for it 
U» = 0.
The constrained UI recipient household (one like the Cohens) 
consumes the i'th commodity as:
Q = ai0 + an YP + YI (YT + U») , i = 1, . . . , N, (B-2)
where Yj = a*ajj , and a* is the inverse of the marginal
propensity to spend on all consumption items, including those for 
which we have no data. 3 ' Specifying the equation in this way 
ensures that, if we had complete data, spending propensities by 
constrained households would sum to one, as the discussion in 
chapter 3 requires. Taking a weighted average of (B-l) and (B-2), 
with a, the fraction of households that finds benefits to be 
adequate, as one weight, and (1 - a) as the other:
Q = ai0 + aii [YP + (1 -a)(YT + U») a*] + ai2a(YT + U'),
i = 1, . . . , N.
Since we wish to include in our estimation observations for 
households that have no UI benefits, and because nonrecipient 
households are assumed to consume just as do unconstrained 
households, this equation can be respecified as:
Q = aio +an[YP + (1 -a)a*(YT + U')D] 
+ ai2 [(1 - D) + aD] (YT + U'), i = 1, . . . , N, (B-3)
2. Holbrook and Stafford (1971), in a study of total consumption out of different types of 
income based on panel data, treat transitory income received in nonconsecutive years as 
uncorrelated, and assume people have a horizon of two years or less. This view suggests 
that the deviation from the average of incomes in two nonconsecutive years may be viewed 
partly as a component of permanent and partly as a component of transitory income.
3. We use a value of a*, 1.122, based on time-series results in Hamermesh (1979).
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where D is an indicator variable equalling one if the individual 
receives UI benefits. Equation (B-3) is the one on which the 
estimates in table 3.3 are based.
Tables B.I and B.2 present the estimates of the coefficients of 
the demographic and retirement-status variables included in 
equations (B-3). It is important to include these seven variables: A 
test of their significance in the estimates for 1972 yielded a X 2 
statistic of 396. The 99 percent point of the X 2 distribution with 28 
degrees of freedom is 48.28. For 1970 the value is X 2(21) = 114, 
also significantly different from zero. There is substantial 
variability in the coefficient estimates between the two 
subsamples. However, we still find, as the tables show, that in 
several cases the estimates are significant and in the same direction 
in both years. (1) Female-headed households and those in which 
the head is fully retired spend significantly less on transportation 
than do others; (2) Households in which there is a married couple, 
and even more so, where there are children, spend significantly 
less on vacations than other households; and (3) Those in which 
the head is partly retired or is a woman spend significantly more 
on housing.
Equations (B-3) were modified to make a a function of YP, 
thus enabling us to test whether the likelihood that benefits are 
inadequate varies with permanent income. We specify a = 
a (YP) using the logistic function:
1 (B-4) a(YP) = ——————————————=—————» 
1 + exp[-.001 /9 0 (YP - YP) + 0! ]
where PQ and /3j are parameters to be estimated. In the
specification in which a was assumed constant, equations (B-3) 
were estimated by ordinary least squares for fixed values of a on 
the grid (0, .05, .1, . . . , 1) to find that value of a that 
maximized the likelihood function of the system. The specification 
of a in (B-4) as a function of YP is estimated by a two-round 
procedure that first specifies a broad lattice of values of ( /SQ, ft j)
and then searches a finer lattice around that pair of values that 
maximized the likelihood function on the first round. In the 1970
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subsample the estimates are £0 = .75 and 0 = -3.5 for the
combined spending categories and for the set of equations (B-3).
In the 1972 subsample the maximizing values were 
$ = 6.5 for both.
= .45 and
Table B.I
Estimates of Effects of Demographic and Work Status Variables on
Spending by Older Workers, 1970









































































a. t-statistics in parentheses.
Table B.2
Estimates of Effects of Demographic and Work Status Variables on Spending by Older Workers, 1972
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a. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Equations (B-3) are a restricted version of:
/3 i2YT(l - D) + 0 i3(YT + U»)D, 
i = 1, . . . , N, (B-5)
where the /3jj are parameters to be estimated. The estimates of
(B-5) are presented in table B.3 for the 1970 and 1972 subsamples. 
The log likelihood ratio for the significance of the regression as a 
whole is -2 log A. , against the alternative that there is only random 
variation in the consumption measures. The regressions as a whole 
are all highly significant, as were those on which the estimated 
spending propensities shown in table 3.3 are based. More 
important, though, is the test of the constraints on (B-5) implied 
by (B-3), the model that forms the basis of our discussion. These 
constraints essentially restrict spending on each commodity out of 
UI to stand in the same ratio to spending out of permanent 
income. Thus a test of the constraints is explicitly a test of our 
hypothesis that spending on different categories out of UI is not 
proportionate. The test statistics for the 1970 and 1972 subsamples
are X 2 (2) = 2.96, and X 2(3) = 4.29 respectively. These are not 
significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, though 
they are not ridiculously small either. They suggest that, 
undoubtedly because of the relatively small number of UI 
recipient households, there is not enough variation to permit so 
finely structured an hypothesis to be properly tested.
Despite the insignificance of the differences between the 
restricted and unrestricted models in equation sets (B-3) and (B-5), 
the differences are in the expected direction. The responsiveness 
index shown in table 3.5 is calculated as:
- B 100 »
where B is the same as the term in braces, { ( , evaluated using 
coefficients from equations like (B-3) and (B-5), but based on 
spending in all categories; and Sj is the share of the i'th category in
Table B.3
Estimates of Parameters in Equations (B.5), 1970 and 1972
Coefficients, 1970 a


































































a. t-statistics in parentheses, 
b. Includes gasoline in 1972. 
•Denotes significance at least at the 90 percent level.
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spending on all categories. Thus the index equals 100 for spending 
on all categories. £13 is just the estimated (unrestricted)
propensity to spend out of UI. The first term in brackets weights 
spending by the estimated fraction, (1 - a), of households for 
which benefits are inadequate; the second term is for the 
fraction, ft, for which benefits are adequate. A higher value for 
the index Rj will occur if spending propensities on the i'th category
out of UI in (B-5) are disproportionately high as compared to the 
average for constrained and unconstrained households in (B-3).
Appendix C
EQUATIONS AND METHODS USED IN ESTIMATING
THE IMPACT OF UI BENEFITS ON LABOR FORCE
AND RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR AMONG OLDER
MARRIED WHITE MALES
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are based on the equation:
N 
L= QO+ ai RECDUI+ (*2 UI$+ .Sj ft{X{+ a^E_2 , (C-l)
where L equals a zero-one variable indicating participation in the 
labor force; UI$ indicates the amount of UI benefits the man 
received (in thousands of dollars); RECDUI equals one if the man 
received any benefits, zero otherwise; the Xj are the demographic
and other control variables; E_2 is employment status two years 
before the sample survey date; and the aj and /9jare parameters
to be estimated. In the equations for full and partial retirement 
status, the variable L is replaced by zero-one dummies for these 
two responses, and the variable E_2 is replaced by the same
retirement variables observed in the previous wave of the RHS. 
Although there are problems with the method (see below), tables 
4.2 and 4.3 present estimates produced by ordinary least squares.
Tables C.I - C.4 present estimates of the basic equations (C-l) 
for the two RHS subsamples disaggregated by age. They are 
qualitatively (though not, as we noted in the text, quantitatively) 
similar to the estimates for the entire subsamples. The fractions of 
variation explained are fairly high for this kind of analysis, as were 
those in the equations for which the results are reported in tables
4.2 and 4.3. In the 1971 subsample, the R2 values were .425, .453, 
and .050 in the equations for labor force participation, full 
retirement status, and partial retirement status. The corresponding 
coefficients of determination for the equations reported in table




Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 60-61 in 1971, N = 720
Percentage point change in the 




















































































a. t-statistics in parentheses.
* Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.2
Effects of UI and Other
of Married White Males
Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status 
Ages 62-64 in 1971, N=944
Percentage point change in the 




















































































a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.3
Effects of UI and Other
of Married White Males
Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status 
Ages 62-64 in 1973, N = 1119
Percentage point change in the 




















































































a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.4
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 65-67 in 1973, N = 941
Percentage point change in the 




















































































a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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The differences between the average UI recipient and the 
average nonrecipient in the probability of subsequent labor force 
participation are calculated as &i + 02 UI$, where the ( A )
denotes the estimated values of the parameters, and the superior 
bar denotes the means of the variable among UI recipients. The 
estimated variance of this average effect is just:
Var ( a 2 ) Uf$ 2 +2-uT$-Cov ( ai a 2 ) + Var ( ai) . (C-2)
The estimates reported in footnote 10 in chapter 4 are calculated 
similarly, except different values of UI$ are used in place of its 
mean,
Because the predicted values of the dependent variables may lie 
outside the zero-one range in the formulation in (C-l), the 
estimates cannot be used if we wish to derive statistically proper 
comparisons of the adjusted differences in retirement probabilities 
between recipients and nonrecipients in the different subsamples. 
Thus the estimated impacts presented in table 4.4 are based on 
logit estimates of equations like (C-l). The estimation was done 
using a logit program developed by Peter Schmidt and discussed in 
Schmidt and Strauss (1975).
The logit coefficients for the two samples, and for the two age 
subgroups within each, are presented in tables C.5 and C.6. As can 
be seen by comparing them to the ordinary least squares estimates 
in tables 4.2, 4.3, and C.I - C.4, the same variables are generally 
significant in the logit estimates. (Logit estimates for the 
probability of being fully retired were also estimated for the entire 
1973 subsample, and the estimates did not differ qualitatively 
from those presented in table 4.3.) The differences presented in 
table 4.4 are calculated by substituting the sample means for the 
Xj and E_2 into the equations containing the logit parameters, and
estimating then the difference in the probability that L = 1 when 
UI$ = UI$ and RECDUI = 1, as compared to when both are zero.
Ill
Table C.5


















































































*Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.6
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a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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The estimates on which table 4.5 is based come from an 
equation like (C-l) to which the following sum has been appended:
YQ MMC + Yj RECDUI-MMC + 72 UI$-MMC , (C-3)
where MMC equals one if the person's current or most recent job 
was in mining, manufacturing or construction, and zero 
otherwise, and the Yj are parameters to be estimated. The
adjusted relative differences reported in the first row are just the 
estimated YQ ; those in the second row are calculated as
YQ + ?! + Y2 Uf$, while those in the third row are
Y 0 + ?! + y 2 (UI$ + 1). where UI$ is the mean UI income 
received by beneficiaries in MMC industries. The standard errors 
of the estimated relative differences between the average UI 
recipient in MMC and elsewhere, upon which the t-statistics 
reported in table 4.5 in chapter 4 are based, are calculated exactly 
as are those based on equation (C-2), except that the Yj 
coefficients are used, as is UI$ for persons in MMC industries. 
The F-statistic on the set of three coefficients in (C-3) is .32, not 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels of 
significance in the 1971 subsample. In the 1973 subsample it equals 
3.92, significant with the appropriate degrees of freedom at the 99 
percent level. Finally, the effects of the other variables in (C-l) 
were not seriously changed by the deletion of persons for whom 
E-2 = 0 or by the addition of the terms in (C-3).
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